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Part 12

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 17, 1983

Part 12

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ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND DECISIONMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1983

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met in open session, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator John Tower (chairman) presiding.

Members present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Jepsen, Quayle, Nunn, and Bingaman.

Staff present: James F. McGovern, staff director and chief counsel; James G. Roche, staff director for the minority; Alan R. Yuspeh, general counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, minority counsel; Christine C. Dauth, chief clerk; Ann E. Sauer, special assistant; Michael B. Donley, Richard D. Finn, Jr., George K. Johnson, Jr., James R. Locher III, David S. Lyles, Bruce D. Porter, Arnold L. Punaro, and James C. Smith, professional staff members; Drew A. Harker and Judith A. Freedman, research assistants; Tamara L. Farnsworth and Toni D. White, staff assistants.

Also present: Dennis P. Sharon, assistant to Senator Goldwater; John G. Campbell and Guy Copeland, assistants to Senator Warner; James H. Dykstra and Larry Siegel, assistants to Senator Cohen; Jon Etherton, assistant to Senator Jepsen; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Quayle; Patrick McKim and Mark J. Albrecht, assistants to Senator Wilson; and Edward McGaffigan, Jr., assistant to Senator Bingaman.

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN TOWER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this afternoon for the twelfth and last session for this year in a series of hearings on the organization and decisionmaking procedures of the Department of Defense.

This afternoon the committee is most fortunate to have a truly distinguished witness, Dr. Harold Brown. Dr. Brown has had extensive experience in national security affairs. He served as Secretary of Defense; Secretary of the Air Force; Director of Defense Research and Engineering; a delegate to the strategic arms limitation talks in Helsinki, Vienna, and Geneva; a member of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; and as a member of the Paris Steering Committee.

On behalf of the committee I welcome Dr. Brown and express our sincere appreciation for the time he has taken to appear before this committee.

Given Dr. Brown's extensive experience and his role as the committee's last witness in this series of hearings, this afternoon's hearing is designed to serve as a wrap-up session during which all areas of the committee's inquiry on the DOD organization and decisionmaking procedures are appropriate for discussion.

The written materials Dr. Brown has furnished the committee provide a useful framework for discussing a broad range of DOD organization issues. As Dr. Brown has requested, two chapters—"Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security" and "Managing the Department of Defense"—from his book, "Thinking About National Security," will be included at an appropriate place in the record in this hearing.

[See appendix, p. 546.]

Before hearing Dr. Brown's remarks, I would like to recognize Senator Nunn for any comments that he might like to make.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have an opening statement, only a word of welcome to Secretary Brown.

We are delighted to have you. I know you have done a lot of thinking about this subject on which you have had tremendous experience in all phases of national security.

I believe Dr. Brown's testimony will be very valuable to us. I look forward to hearing from him.

Mr. Chairman, I regret I could not be here this morning. I know you had a very good hearing. I had to be at the organized crime hearing. I am delighted to be here this afternoon.

Chairman TOWER. Dr. Brown, we are delighted to have you. You are a familiar figure to this committee. I must say that although from time to time we have disagreed on matters of national security policy, I think you have made an enormous contribution as Secretary of Defense and we regard you as perhaps one of the most important, if not the most important, witness that we could have in the course of these hearings.

We will be delighted to have you proceed. You may submit anything you like for the record, your statement in its entirety or summarize it as you see fit. In any case, all materials submitted will be included in full in the record.

STATEMENT OF DR. HAROLD BROWN, FORMER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary BROWN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I am pleased to testify before you this morning about organization for national security affairs. The issues I will discuss are not limited to matters concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even to the entire Department of Defense, but I plan to emphasize those perspectives.

My detailed views on a broad range of these matters are set forth in my book "Thinking About National Security," in the chapters called Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security and Managing the Department of Defense, to which you referred, Mr. Chairman.

I understand that copies have been provided to members of the committee, and ask that they be incorporated into the record. I do not plan to read or even to summarize them here. Later I will make a few points from them, and add a few further thoughts that I have had since writing them.

[See appendix, p. 546.]

I have concluded instead that my oral presentation today ought to concentrate on the matter of which questions I think might be most productive for the committee to address in its own consideration of legislation.

These questions are likely to be fundnamental ones, and it may well be that the committee's consideration will result in a decision not to write new legislation about some or even about any of these issues.

Some problems would be helped by changes in organization, and of these some fraction would require, or at least be encouraged by legislation.

I would note first that organization can make the achievement of desired goals more difficult or easier, but other factors are also important.

Personal leadership, the morale of an organization's members, the values, skills, and attitudes that its members bring to it from the society that produces them, these are just as important, if not more so.

Second, it is also a truism that the individuals in senior positions in the organization, by their personalities, their interrelationships, and their dedication to its goals, can make it work despite dysfunctional organizational structure. They will cause it to fail if they lack the proper qualities, even if the organization itself is functional and well set up.

My third observation along these lines is that organizations are normally difficult to change; one with over 3 million members, and within a governmental structure, is likely to be particularly so.

In general, only major failures—in a major war, and with national consequences—clearly traceable to the organization are likely to provide motivation for a radical change.

The organization of the national security structure does have a major effect on how well it functions. How should we try to improve it?

A tactical issue here is whether it is better to pick some small piece and try to improve that, or attempt a major change of the components of the national security system inside and outside the Defense Department.

As a practical matter, my own judgment is that the latter is not feasible at this time. Too many different power centers would have to be for it, and I do not see that sort of consensus present at this time.

It may be that next year or the year after—times which meet the criteria that I set forth as the occasion of change in the last paragraph of the "Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security" chapter of my book to which I have referred—change in some of the components of the Defense Department would be feasible to enact into law.

The organizational problems can, of course, be considered at various levels.

One is the respective responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches. These range at one end to the War Powers Act, which is a major functional and, indeed, constitutional question.

At the other end lies the question of whether the House of Representatives or the Senate will prevail with respect to development programs on high energy lasers.

Whether shortwave length or longwave length infrared frequencies shall be used seems rather far from what the Founding Fathers would have considered a legislative responsibility, even though Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson themselves, had they been informed on these matters, could have contributed to the technical question in a constructive way.

Senator NUNN. Are you suggesting that we don't have people of that caliber here now?

If you are, I will agree with you.

[Laughter.]

Secretary BROWN. I think there are some very able people in the Congress, but that is quite aside from the question of whether that is what they ought to be devoting their attention to.

Second, there are the relationships at the top of the executive branch, between the President and his staff, and the executive departments and agencies, and how these interact in the National Security Council. I gather you heard something about that this morning.

Finally, there is the matter of organization within the Department of Defense. This can be divided into two parts, the relationships respectively of the Secretary of Defense, and his staff, to the military departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Unified and Specified Commands.

Let me turn now to some fundamental issues. The first is whether the Secretary of Defense should be in full charge of the Defense Department? Should he be in the chain of military command?

Why not have the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or each of the Chiefs individually, report directly to the President, or, as has also I guess been suggested, directly to some super staff individual in the White House? That is the way that President Roosevelt worked it during World War II.

On the other hand, it was that experience which led to the writing of the National Security Act, which established the present system. In it, the Secretary of Defense is the President's full-time deputy on defense matters, and by law in the chain of command between the President and the Unified and Specified Commanders, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as his agent, by Executive order and Department of Defense directive, not by law.

This may seem an academic matter, but in fact both the administration bill on Joint Chiefs of Staff organization and the House bill on that subject raise significant questions.

The former puts the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by law in the command chain, and says that the President or Secretary of Defense shall issue orders to the Unified and Specified Commanders through the chairman of the Joint Chiefs.

I don't find any objection in principle to having the chairman of the JCS in the chain of command. I think it would be a terrible outcome if

that was the only substantive change that took place in a reorganization. If that one particular alteration is a piece with which you can buy acceptance of other more fundamental changes, then I think it would be worth doing.

The language, however, opens a very large loophole when it says the President or Secretary of Defense shall issue orders to CINCs only through the chairman. That language opens a very large loophole for some White House official—for example, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—to go around the Secretary of Defense and, claiming to speak in the President's name, issue orders directly.

So, I think there is a risk there.

The House bill goes one step further. It makes the chairman of the Joint Chiefs a member of the National Security Council. He would be the only member who has in the past been subordinate to another member other than the President, and by implication this would establish a separate reporting and command channel.

As things are now, the chairman or any chief of service, has by law the right to go to the President directly with a concern or appeal. In practice he is expected to, and in my experience as Secretary of Defense always did, inform the Secretary of Defense of this action and its content in advance.

But the House language would have, in my judgment, a significant effect both on the principals and at staff level. Papers for the National Security Council generated in the Department of Defense are still, I believe, coordinated between the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before they are taken to the National Security Council or the President.

That does not mean that the two offices always agree, although usually differences are resolved at the level of the Secretary of Defense and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If not, the Secretary of Defense generally allows the JCS position to be presented separately at the staff level. But the language of the House bill, in my judgment, would encourage the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs to bring an uncoordinated position into NSC interagency meetings on the grounds that the JCS should not have to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense any more than the Secretary of State, also a member of the National Security Council, has to.

Now, the President can arrange to run things that way under present legislation if he wishes to. The Secretary of Defense would, in my opinion, then have to consider his position, as the British say when talking about a prospective resignation. Why encourage this possible problem by writing it into legislation?

One answer is that there may well be a natural tendency on the part of the Congress to encourage multiple power centers within the executive branch so that it can deal with these centers individually.

Certainly this has been the case with respect to the military departments and services, though considerably less so with respect to the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Moreover, Congress operates with no single individual in charge, and one's own model always has certain attractions.

But a price is paid when the authority of the Secretary of Defense is undermined. He is the only full-time civilian who can be held re-

sponsible for the operation of the Military Establishment, and the more divided his authority, the less his responsibility, whether for military planning and operations, or for readiness, or for decisions on military systems, or for procurement practices.

Why can't the President himself be that authority? Unless he is willing to devote most of his time to that function, he cannot exercise such a responsibility. He needs a full-time civilian deputy.

In the absence of the Secretary of Defense serving in that role, it will be exercised either directly by one or more military officers, or on a part-time or most-of-the-time basis by some assistant in the White House. In my judgment, both of those are much worse arrangements.

Of course, even though the law puts the Secretary of Defense in charge and in the chain of command, in practice there are possibilities for him to be circumvented either by a buccaneering chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a devious Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or both. But that is no reason to encourage such behavior by putting loopholes into the law.

A second set of fundamental issues involves questions of systems decisions and procurement. What changes should be made in order to decide things about weapons systems more sensibly and to procure them more efficiently and less expensively?

Independent offices for testing, taking the responsibility for development, and perhaps even procurement, out of the military services and setting up a separate entity in the Defense Department to do that, or even setting up a separate entity outside the Defense Department, have been suggested.

Some countries have tried the latter in the form of a Ministry of Supply or a Ministry of Aviation and it has not worked.

My own views, expressed more lengthily in print, are that close connections of the professional military are needed with development and procurement, and also with testing, though these relations need not be exactly the same for all of those activities.

And there must be a point below the President at which military planning and operations on the one hand and training, material development and procurement, and testing all come together.

Thus, I do not see the need for major legislatively mandated reorganization in this area, but the committee will undoubtedly want to consider the question.

I would urge you, however, at the same time to reconsider existing legislation which says "procure things at the lowest possible cost except * * *," where "except" refers to set-asides for high unemployment areas or small business, or a host of other objectives socially or politically desirable.

There are plenty of deficiencies in the defense training, procurement, and testing areas now. But all of them are made more difficult to solve by existing legislation.

I am torn about asking you to reconsider it, because I fear that changes in legislation could well, in the face of understandable political pressures, make them still more difficult.

Duplication in medical services, in training, in military bases, et cetera, are difficult enough to remove because of bureaucratic inertia and parochialism.

My experience is that attempts in the Defense Department to do so are responded to by the introduction in Congress of blocking legislation, even in cases where the existing Defense Reorganization Act gives the Secretary of Defense or the President the authority to make such reorganizations in the absence of a congressional veto.

That veto is applied in a way that goes around the Reorganization Act, usually by adding it to appropriations legislation, but sometimes to authorizing legislation.

Many of the individual improvements in efficiency that are sorely needed are discussed in the written material to which I have referred.

The third area to which I suggest the committee direct some attention is that of the organization of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of the Secretary of Defense interacts with these, and ought to be adjusted in its organization by the Secretary of Defense in response to whatever emerges in the way of changes in the military department and JCS organization.

But the principal issue is how to carry out the two general functions of planning the use of military force and actually applying it on the one hand, and recruiting, training, indoctrinating, and equipping the force on the other.

This division represents the two principal operational functions of the Defense Department. I exclude for this purpose the advisory function that the Secretary of Defense performs for the President in the broader field of national security, including the interaction of foreign policy and military policy. Let us set that aside for the moment.

The Secretary of Defense exercises his responsibility for force development principally through the Military Departments and Services. This function includes research and development, procurement of weapons systems, recruitment, training, and personnel functions, et cetera.

The second function is force application—combat and the immediate logistic support for it, which is exercised through the Unified and Specified Commands, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as agent for the Secretary of Defense.

The central question of organization within the Department of Defense is how the Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Secretary, who should serve as his alter ego, should exercise these responsibilities through the various components.

One component is the headquarters' combined military staff—now the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff—and, in the field, the Unified and Specified Commands.

A second component is the military departments, with the service secretaries and their secretariats, the service chiefs and their staffs.

The third component is the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

As my lengthier writings indicate, my own conclusion is that the military departments and services should be taken out of the business of strategy, political-military affairs, and for application. They should be given more responsibility and authority, and held responsible, for the force development and acquisition process.

In particular, the service secretaries or service chiefs of staff should be given clearer responsibility for most weapons systems development

and procurement and held accountable by the Secretary of Defense for the results.

Delegation should in turn be made to a program manager, usually a military officer, who should be kept in that position for a sufficient period—at least 5 to 7 years—to provide continuity and to be held responsible in turn for the results.

Finally, and of great importance, there is the matter of organization for planning and execution of military operations.

To deal with this matter, we must turn to the organization and responsibilities in the military operational chain of command. This runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense with, in theory, the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a committee serving as the agent for the Secretary of Defense in dealing with the Unified and Specified Command. In practice, even now, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs acts in that role.

My own judgment is that what I will call a combined military staff, or general staff, headed by the single chief of military staff with an alter ego deputy from a complementary military service background, should be created and given the responsibility for planning and direction for force application.

Lesser moves are possible in that direction, including strengthening the chairman's role within the present Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In any event, the Unified and Specified Commanders will require greater control than they now have over the planning and execution functions of their component commands.

More of the details of the approach are set forth in the document that I have submitted for the record.

I would like to turn now to some further thoughts that I have had about the situation and about my proposals since writing them last year.

First, I would note that strong personal identification with a service on the part of individual military personnel, and especially of officers with considerable length of service, is inevitable and probably desirable.

One alternative is the Canadian approach of abolishing the services, which I do not think would work in the United States. I have questions about whether it is working in Canada.

The only other I can think of with respect to the combined military staff would be to have its members enter a separate career corps immediately upon commission, and even to have a general staff academy in parallel with the present service academies.

I think that would be a bad idea because it would be too early in the careers of military officers for both themselves and others to decide whether they would be those best qualified for a combined military staff, or should be directed to or elect a career in one of the services.

A transition to the combined military staff—which I think desirable—would, therefore, have to come instead at the O–5 or O–6 level, and would thus follow lengthy service in a particular service. Their service identification would be strong and persist to a degree. Perhaps in many cases it would dominate the necessary joint service loyalty.

However, if the subsequent environment, promotions, and functions of those transferred to a combined military staff element, which not be confined solely to headquarters, but can also contain individuals in the Unified and Specified Command Staffs, a combined service orientation could be engendered and this problem at least limited.

A matter of which I have not sufficiently touched on earlier is the number of levels in the Joint Staff at which Joint Staff papers are now considered. There are at least three before it gets to the Joint Chiefs themselves, not to mention the levels within the services that are now consulted before the briefing paper for the service chief himself is prepared.

That is in part responsible for the length of time that it takes to get recommendations from the Joint Chiefs' organization and for their lowest common denominator nature. The telescoping of that process would help even the present organization.

I would note that reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not by any means solve all the programing and budgeting difficulties and dysfunctions that are now found in the defense program.

The tendency toward a mismatch between force structure and budgets would still remain. Conflict would still also persist as to the proper balance between procurement of major systems and operation and maintenance funds.

But the management of those issues will, in any event, still have to come largely from the force development side of the Defense Department, the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The combined military staff would not be fully immune from service rivalries. But even if it were, there would still be further conflicts that would have to be resolved in programing and budgeting. These include competition between different potential theaters of operations, and between tactical and strategic forces, for resources.

In all these cases, a combined military staff and a chief of military staff would help to provide more unified and authoritative military input.

Beyond the conflicts within the Department of Defense, there exists competition for defense dollars among different geographical areas within the United States, among different contractors, and, as is perfectly legitimate and indeed desirable in a representative form of government, the congressional forces that represent them.

My proposals for reorganizing Defense would not resolve those issues. I don't really have a proposal for how to take care of these congressional problems, for that is—largely—what they are.

What could be hoped for from the kind of reorganization that I have proposed is better strategic planning, more coherently devised and effectively carried out.

It should also provide better military advice on a prompt basis to civilian decisionmakers, and provide an evaluation of capability and readiness separate from the services whose performance is being judged.

Finally, I would like to emphasize my expectation that such a change in organization would shift to the military more of the re-

sponsibility for military strategy and planning, evaluation of military effectiveness, and recommendations on force composition.

I know that this is a matter of much concern to the Congress, and it was to me when I was Secretary of Defense. Although much of this function now resides in civilian-headed parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, that is not the best way to do it.

The civilian-headed parts of the Office of the Secretary—the Policy and International Security Affairs Offices, the Program Evaluation and Analysis Office, the Research and Engineering Office, for example—will nonetheless always have a function. The Secretary of Defense will always depend on these offices to some degree for input on such questions. But the more authoritative and less parochial the experienced military staff and the advice that it provides can become, the more weight that advice and experience will have.

I believe it would be desirable for it to have more weight and more effect than it has now.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my prepared statement for the hearing record.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Harold Brown follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. HAROLD BROWN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, I am pleased to testify before you this morning about organization for national security affairs. The issues I will discuss are not limited to matters concerning the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or even to the entire Department of Defense, but I plan to emphasize those perspectives. My detailed views on a broad range of these matters are set forth in chapters of my book *Thinking About National Security*, in the chapters called "Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security," and "Managing the Department of Defense." I understand that copies have been provided to members of the committee, and I ask that they be incorporated into the Record. I do not plan to read or even to summarize them here. I will later make a few points from them, and add a few further thoughts that I have had since writing them.

I have concluded instead that my oral presentation today ought to concentrate on the matter of which questions I think might be most productive for the committee to address in its own consideration of legislation. These questions are likely to be fundamental ones, and it may well be that the committee's consideration will result in a decision not to write new legislation about some or even about any of these issues. Some problems would be helped by changes in organization, and of these some fraction would require or at least be encouraged by legislation.

I would note first that organization can make the achievement of desired goals more difficult or easier, but other factors are also important. Personal leadership, the morale of an organization's members, the values, skills, and attitudes that its members bring to it from the society that produces them: these are just as important, if not more so. Second, the individuals in senior positions in the organization—by their personalities, their interrelationships, and their dedication to its goals—can make it work despite dysfunctional organizational structure. They will cause it to fail if they lack the proper qualities, even if the organization itself is functional and well set up. My third observation along these lines is that organizations are normally difficult to change; one with over three million members, and within a governmental structure, is likely to be particularly so. In general, only major failures—in a major war, and with national consequences—clearly traceable to the organization are likely to provide motivation for a radical change.

The organization of the national security structure does have a major effect on how well it functions. How should we try to improve it? A tactical issue here is whether it is better to pick some small piece and try to improve that, or attempt a major change of the components of the national security system inside and outside the Defense Department. As a practical matter, my own judgment is that the

latter is not feasible at this time. Too many different power centers would have to be for it, and I do not see that sort of consensus present at this time. It may be that next year or the year after (times which meet the criteria that I set forth as the occasion of change in the last paragraph of the "Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security" chapter of my book to which I have referred) change in some of the components of the Defense Department would be feasible to enact into law.

The organizational problems can of course be considered at various levels. One is the respective responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches. These range at one end to the War Powers Act, which is a major functional and indeed constitutional question. At the other end lies the question of whether the House of Representatives or the Senate will prevail with respect to development programs on high energy lasers. Whether short wave length or long wave length infra-red frequencies shall be used seems rather far from what the Founding Fathers would have considered a legislative responsibility. Second, there are the relationships at the top of the executive branch, between the President and his staff, and the executive departments and agencies, and how these interact in the National Security Council.

Finally, there is the matter of organization within the Department of Defense. This can be divided into two parts, the relationships respectively of the Secretary of Defense (and his staff) to the military departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commands.

Let me turn now to some fundamental issues. The first is whether the Secretary of Defense should be in full charge of the Defense Department. Should he be in the chain of military command? Why not have the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or each of the Chiefs individually, report directly to the President? That is the way that President Roosevelt worked it during World War II. On the other hand, it was that experience that led to the writing of the National Security Act, which established the present system. In it, the Secretary of Defense is the President's full-time deputy on defense matters, and by law in the chain of command between the President and the unified and specified commanders, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as his agent (by Executive Order and Department of Defense directive, not by law).

This may seem an academic matter, but in fact both the administration bill on Joint Chiefs of Staff Organization and the House bill on that subject raise significant questions. The former puts the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by law in the command chain, and says that the President or Secretary of Defense shall issue orders to the unified and specified commanders through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. That language opens a very large loophole for some White House official—for example, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—to go around the Secretary of Defense and, claiming to speak in the President's name, issue orders directly. The House bill makes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs a member of the National Security Council. He would be the only member who has in the past been subordinate to another member other than the President, and by the implication this would establish a separate reporting and command channel. As things are now, the Chairman, or any Chief of Service, has by law the right to go to the President directly with a concern or appeal. In practice he is expected to, and in my experience as Secretary of Defense always did, inform the Secretary of Defense of the action and its content in advance. But the House language would have in my judgment a significant effect both on the principals and at staff level. Papers for the National Security Council generated in the Department of Defense are still, I believe, coordinated between the Office of Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff before they are taken to the National Security Council or to the President. That does not mean that the two offices always agree, although usually they are resolved either at the level of the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If not, the Secretary of Defense generally allows the JCS position to be presented separately at the Staff level. But the language of the House bill, in my judgment, would encourage the Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs to bring an uncoordinated position into NSC interagency meetings, on the grounds that the JCS should not have to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense any more than the Secretary of State, also a member of the National Security Council, has to.

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resignation. Why encourage this possible problem by writing it into legislation? One answer is that there may well be a natural tendency on the part of the Congress to encourage multiple power centers within the executive branch so that it can deal with these centers individually. Certainly this has been the case with respect to the military departments and services, though considerably less so with respect to the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, Congress operates with no single individual in charge, and one's own model always has certain attractions.

But a price is paid when the authority of the Secretary of Defense is undermined. He is the only full-time civilian who can be held responsible for the operation of the military establishment, and the more divided his authority, the less his responsibiiity, whether for military planning and operations, or for readiness, or for decisions on military systems, or for procurement practices.

Why can't the President himself be that authority? Unless he is willing to devote most of his time to that function, he can not exercise such a responsibility. He needs a full-time civilian deputy. In the absence of the Secretary of Defense serving in that role, it will be exercised either directly by one or more military officers, or on a part-time or most-of-the-time basis by some assistant in the White House. In my judgment both of those are much worse arrangements.

Of course, even though the law puts the Secretary of Defense in charge and in the chain of command, in practice there are possibilities for him to be circumvented either by a buccaneering Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or by a devious Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or both. But that is no reason to encourage such behavior by putting loopholes into the law.

A second set of fundamental issues involves questions of systems decisions and procurement. What changes should be made in order to decide things about weapons systems more sensibly and to procure them more efficiently an less expensively? Independent offices for testing, taking the responsibility for development (and perhaps even procurement) out of the military services and setting up a separate entity in the Defense Department to do that, or even setting up a separate entity outside the Defense Department have been suggested. Some countries have tried the latter in the form of a Ministry of Supply or a Ministry of Aviation. My own views, expressed more lengthily in print, are that close connections of the professional military are needed with development and procurement, and also with testing, though these relations need not be exactly the same for all of those activities. And there must be a point below the President at which military planning and operations on the one hand and training, materiel development and procurement, and testing all come together. Thus, I do not see the need for major legislatively mandated reorganization in this area, but the committee will undoubtedly want to consider the question. I would urge you, however, at the same time to reconsider existing legislation which says "procure things at the lowest possible cost except . . ." where "except" refers to set-asides for high unemployment areas or small business, or a host of other objectives socially or political desirable.

There are plenty of deficiencies in the defense training, procurement, and testing areas now. But all of them are made more difficult to solve by existing legislation. I am torn about asking you to reconsider it, because I fear that changes in legislation could well, in the face of understandable political pressures, make them still more difficult. Duplication in medical services, in training, in military bases, etc. are difficult enough to remove because of bureaucratic inertia and parochialism. My experience is that attempts in the Defense Department to do so are responded to by the introduction in Congress of blocking legislation, even in cases where the existing Defense Reorganization Act gives the Secretary of Defense or the President the authority to make such reorganization in the absence of a congressional veto. That veto is applied in a way that goes around the Reorganization Act, usually by adding it to appropriations legislation, but sometimes to authorizing legislation.

Many of the individual improvements in efficiency that are sorely needed are discussed in the written material to which I have referred.

The third area to which I suggest the committee direct some attention is that of the organization of the military departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Office of the Secretary of Defense interacts with these, and ought to be adjusted in its organization by the Secretary of Defense in response to whatever emerges in the way of changes in the military department and JCS organization.

But the principal issue is how to carry out the two general functions of planning the use of military force and actually applying it on the one hand, and recruiting, training, indoctrinating, and equipping the force on the other. This division represents the two principal operational functions of the Defense Department. I exclude for this purpose the advisory function that the Secretary of Defense provides the President in the broader field of national security, including the interaction of foreign policy and military policy.

The Secretary of Defense exercises his responsibility for force development principally through the military departments and service. This function includes research and development, procurement of weapons systems, recruitment, training, and personnel functions, etc. The second function is force application—combat and the immediate logistic support for it, which is exercised through the unified and specified commands, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff acting as agent for the Secretary of Defense. The central question of organization within the Department of Defense is how the Secretary of Defense (and the Deputy Secretary, who should serve as his alter ego) should exercise these responsibilities through the various components. One component is the headquarters combined military staff—now the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff—and, in the field, the unified and specified commands. A second component is the military departments, with the service Secretaries and their secretariats, the service chiefs and their staffs. The third component is the staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

As my lengthier writings indicate, my own conclusion is that the military departments and services should be taken out of the business of strategy, political-military affairs, and force application. They should be given more responsibility and authority—and held responsible—for the force development and acquisition process. In particular, the service Secretaries or service Chiefs of Staff should be given clearer responsibility for most weapons systems development and procurement and held accountable by the Secretary of Defense for the results. Delegation should in turn be made to a program manager, usually a military officer, who should be kept in that position for a sufficient period—at least five to seven years—to provide continuity and to be held responsible in turn for the results.

Finally and of great importance, there is the matter of organization for planning and execution of military operations. To deal with this matter, we must turn to the organization and responsibilities in the military operational chain of command. This runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense with (in theory) the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as a committee as the agent for the Secretary of Defense in dealing with the unified and specified command. In practice, even now, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs acts in that role.

My own judgment is that what I will call a Combined Military Staff (or General Staff), headed by a single Chief of Military Staff with an alter ego Deputy from a complimentary military service background, should be created and given the responsibility for planning and directing force application. Lesser moves are possible in that direction, including strengthening the Chairman's role within the present Joint Chiefs of Staff. In any event, the unified and specified commanders will require greater control than they now have over the planning and execution functions of their component commands. More of the details of the approach are set forth in the document that I have submitted for the Record.

I would like to turn now to some further thoughts that I have had about the situation and about my proposals since writing them last year. First I would note that strong personal identification with a service on the part of individual military personnel, and especially of officers with considerable length of service, is inevitable and probably desirable. One alternative is the Canadian approach of abolishing the services, which I do not think would work in the U.S.—and I have questions about whether it is working in Canada. The only other I can think of with respect to the Combined Military Staff would be to have its members enter a separate career corps immediately upon commission, and even to have a General Staff Academy in parallel with the present service academies. I think that would be a bad idea because it would be too early in the careers of military officers for both themselves and others to decide whether they would be those best qualified for a Combined Military Staff, or should be directed to or elect a career in one of the services.

A transition to the Combined Military Staff—which I think desirable—would, therefore, have to come instead at the 05 or 06 level, and would thus follow lengthy service in a particular service. Their service identification would be strong and persist to a degree. Perhaps in many cases it would dominate

the necessary joint service loyalty. However, if the subsequent environment, promotions, and functions of those transferred to a Combined Military Staff element (which need not be confined solely to headquarters but can also contain individuals in the unified and specified command staffs) a combined service orientation could be engendered and this problem at least limited.

A matter of which I have not touched on sufficiently earlier is the number of levels in the Joint Staff at which Joint Staff papers are now considered. There are at least three before it gets to the Joint Chiefs themselves, not to mention the levels within the services that are now consulted before the briefing paper for the service chief himself is prepared. That is in part responsible for the length of time that it takes to get recommendations from the Joint Chiefs organization and for their lowest common denominator nature. The telescoping of that process would help even the present organization.

I would note that reorganization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not by any means solve all the programing and budgeting difficulties and dysfunctions that are now found in the defense program. The tendency toward a mismatch between force structure and budgets would still remain. Conflict would still also persist as to the proper balance between procurement of major systems and operation and maintenance funds. But the management of those issues will in any event still have to come largely from the force development side of the Defense Department—the military departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Combined Military Staff would not be fully immune from service rivalries. But even if it were, there would still be further conflicts that would have to be resolved in programing and budgeting. These include competition between different potential theaters of operations, and between tactical and strategic forces, for resources. In all these cases, a Combined Military Staff and a Chief of Military Staff would help to provide more unified and authoritative military input.

Beyond the conflicts within the Department of Defense, there exists competition for defense dollars among different geographical areas within the United States, among different contractors, and—as is perfectly legitimate and indeed desirable in a representative form of government—the congressional forces that represent them. My proposals for reorganizing Defense would not resolve those issues.

What could be hoped for from the kind of reorganization that I have proposed is better strategic planning, more coherently devised and effectively carried out. It should also provide better military advice on a prompt basis to civilian decisionmakers, and provide an evaluation of capability and readiness separate from the services whose performance is being judged.

Finally, I would like to emphasize my expectation that such a change in organization would shift to the military more of the responsibility for military strategy and planning, evaluation of military effectiveness, and recommendations on force composition. Much of this now resides in civilian-headed parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The latter will always have a function, and the Secretary of Defense will always depend on them to some degree for inputs on such questions, but the more authoritative and less parochial the experienced military staff and the advice it provides can become, the more weight that advice and experience will have.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I think before we start questions, there is a vote on the floor. We will suspend for about 7 or 8 minutes. If everybody will vote and return immediately, we will get on to the questions.

This vote is on the motion to table the Armstrong amendment to the housing package.

[Recess.]

Chairman TOWER. The committee will come to order.

Dr. Brown, 2 years ago the British Ministry of Defense abolished their service secretariats and established in its place two deputies, one for operations and one for procurement.

What is your view on the abolition of the service secretariats?

Secretary BROWN. I think it might well make sense as part of a larger package of change.

If the service Chiefs were to be separated from their joint responsibilities and were replaced in that role by a Chief of Military Staff and combined military staff, then I think the service Chiefs might be able to handle the roles that the service Secretaries now play and that would reduce duplication considerably.

I would not transfer the service Secretary functions to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, however. I think the Office of the Secretary of Defense has enough to do now. Maybe it should be reorganized, but that is a separate matter.

The service Secretary in recent decades has served several useful functions. He can insulate the service Chief from direct political interactions, which is desirable to do. He can serve as the agent of the Secretary of Defense in explaining and obtaining compliance with the Secretary of Defense's decisions, or he can work as the agent of the service in putting their case to the Secretary of Defense perhaps better than the service Chief can do.

But it is also possible for a service Secretary to increase the tension between the service and the Office of the Secretary of Defense by amplifying service demands without filtering them.

On balance if we were starting all over again, it would make sense to me to have a combined military staff, Chief of Military Staff, and then have service Chiefs rather than service Chiefs and service Secretaries.

Chairman TOWER. You don't think that would weaken civilian control of the military?

Secretary BROWN. I think that the service Secretary does play a part there, but I think it really has to come from the Secretary of Defense. This is so especially because the civilian control we are most concerned about is operational control over the application of military force and the service Secretary doesn't play a part in that.

Chairman TOWER. Currently, at least 25 senior defense officials are ostensibly used to report to the Secretary of Defense. This includes 21 OSD officials, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the three service Secretaries.

Does this reporting structure violate the traditional management principles regarding span of control?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, it does, Mr. Chairman. I hate to sound like a person who is reminiscing about his own experience. I hope I am not quite old enough to spend all my time doing that yet, but when I came into office in 1977, I counted up the number and it was something like 34 people ostensibly reporting directly to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. I make no distinction between Secretary and Deputy Secretary; it is one box.

Thirty-odd people reported to that box. I cut it down to about 15 which is still too many, but I think perhaps manageable by 2 people.

To do that you have to introduce some layering, at least the appearance of layering, that is, channel some of those people to others who report directly to the Secretary of Defense.

It is worth doing that, I think, because if 34 people, or even ostensibly 25 report to the Secretary of Defense, it means that a good many

of them are, in fact, not reporting to anybody, and that is a bad situation.

I would also have to add in all candor that some of these positions and direct reporting channels, are mandated by congressional actions. The Congress, and the same thing happens within the executive branch when it wants to highlight the importance of something, raises a specific function in the management structure and says it shall report directly to the Secretary of Defense, thus showing how important it is.

There are a lot of important things and, unfortunately, what happens is that even after they begin to lose some of their importance, there is enough of a constituency for them so that you can't easily change an arrangement that has been embodied in legislation.

Chairman TOWER. Can you tell us how you divided management responsibilities between yourself and your Deputy Secretary of Defense?

Secretary BROWN. To some degree it depended on the individual and the talents of the individual.

Chairman TOWER. You had two Deputy Secretaries.

Secretary BROWN. One at time.

Chairman TOWER. That is what I mean. You had Duncan and then Claytor.

Secretary BROWN. Yes. Actually, you will recall when I came into office the legislation included two Deputy Secretaries of Defense, and I asked to have that changed and succeeded because I think you can have at most one alter ego, you can't have more than one.

After a brief learning period, and with Charles Duncan it was very brief because he learned very quickly, I tended to leave most of the procurement and manpower and personnel decisions to him.

I dealt with international affairs—relations with NATO, Japan, the PRC, and the Middle East. I also retained an interest in the R&D matters simply because I happened to have some professional expertise there. Generally I dealt with the operational matters when I was around, although in every case when I wasn't around, however, the Deputy Secretary knew enough about these matters to make the decisions in my absence because of the relationship we had.

If you divide things really into support or force structure, budgeting, and so forth, and operational, military matters, and dealing with the international and interagency process, I tried to hand over as much as I could of the budgeting, force structure, procurement, and personnel matters to my Deputy, retaining some of the planning and research and development interest, myself, while concentrating as much as I could on the other two functions, the relations with the military and the international and interagency processes—and perforce doing much of the congressional interaction—myself.

That is more or less the way it went with both Duncan and Claytor. But again, the principle was that each of us knew enough about what the other was doing so that one of us could be out of town and decisions could still be made.

Chairman TOWER. Within the Washington headquarters of the Department of Defense, there is no organization that is structured to reflect major defense missions such as defense of NATO Europe, defense of the Persian Gulf region, and nuclear deterrence.

Do you think the Joint Staff should be organized along mission lines?

Secretary BROWN. Within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Chairman, there are subunits that do have some of these functions.

For example, within the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs there are deputies for NATO and Europe, for the Far East, and so forth. They look at those geographical areas.

There is a deputy under secretary in research and engineering who looks at strategic forces, and the same thing is true of strategic forces—and tactical forces—within programs analysis and evaluation as well.

There is, however, as you suggest, no Joint Chiefs of Staff element that is divided according to the Unified and Specified Commands.

I would not replace the present organization, the present manpower and personnel, logistics, command and control communications, and so forth—the J-staffs—planning, operations, with a purely CINC-oriented staff.

I just don't think that would work. You still would have to have the functions that run across the board as you do now. But it might very well make sense at least to initiate a system whereby the CINC's had small elements representing them in Washington and situated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

We actually tried something like that with the Washington liaison office of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. That, I gather, has just now been disestablished. Maybe it is not necessary now.

But putting a few people from each of the CINC's into headquarters so their voices can be heard directly would make sense or could make sense.

You would have to worry a little bit to assure that those people didn't become kind of super CINC's. That is to say, those individuals, because they were in headquarters, could actually become players on their own and even though they were only brigadiers or commodores actually end up giving orders to the CINC's.

Chairman TOWER. My time has expired.

Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Brown, on page 10 of your testimony here you say:

> As my lengthier writings indicate, my own conclusion is that the Military Departments and Services should be taken out of the business of strategy, political-military affairs, and force application.

Then over a little further you recommend a combined general staff, military staff.

As I understand it, you are talking about greatly strengthening the Joint Chiefs as an institution with a much stronger Chairman. Is that right?

Secretary BROWN. I would go farther than that, Senator Nunn.

I would rearrange that situation so that service Chiefs were not members of the Joint Chiefs, that there was a Chief of Military Staff and a deputy from a complementary military background. The Chiefs of service would be only Chiefs of service. There would be a combined military staff which would report to the Chief of Military Staff, and they would be responsible for the planning and execution of military operations.

Senator NUNN. That is the point I didn't get in this and I think it is very important.

You are saying take the service Chiefs as they now exist and put them in charge of basically——

Secretary BROWN. The service functions.

Senator NUNN. And then have another group of people who would comprise the Joint Staff?

Secretary BROWN. Right.

Senator NUNN. How would you choose people and what role would the services play in designating people to serve on that?

Who would make the choice about the composition of that?

Secretary BROWN. I would say that those people should be picked by the Chief of Military Staff and his immediate organization.

The services could nominate, but those people when they made that transition—I say elsewhere that transition would be made at the O–5, O–6 level, lieutenant colonel, colonel, Navy commander, Navy captain level—would henceforth be purple suited. Their promotions and assignments would be determined separately and not by the services any longer.

Senator NUNN. That would be it as far as their career? They would not go back?

Secretary BROWN. With rare exceptions——

Senator NUNN. They would never become service Chiefs?

Secretary BROWN. With rare exceptions. I would leave the possibility they could become, for example, CINC's and then become service Chiefs or vice versa.

But that would be rare. By and large, they would stay in joint duty thereafter with some exceptions.

Senator NUNN. Does that have a tendency to cut them off from career promotion?

Every young member of the service wants to be a service Chief. Once they are put in a purple suit, will that be an incentive for them or will it be a disincentive?

Secretary BROWN. It would certainly hurt their chances of promotion if those chances continued to be determined within their service.

It would not if those promotions were handled by a separate combined purple suited organization.

Whether the much smaller—or zero—chance of becoming a service Chief would be a disincentive or the other possible positions on incentive depends, it seems to me, on the individual and his own ambitions and talents.

Remember that I am talking about a group from which, by and large, the Unified and Specified Commanders might very well be picked.

Senator NUNN. There would have to be some incentive. Of course, the Secretary of Defense and President choose those people under the present system.

Secretary BROWN. They do.

Senator NUNN. You would continue that system?

Secretary BROWN. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. The services don't usually choose the CINC.

Secretary BROWN. They don't choose them, but they have a pretty strong say.

Senator NUNN. It seems to me to get purple suited over there, that they are going to be dispassionate about parochialism, they are going to have to have somebody other than services choose the Chiefs for promotion.

Secretary BROWN. It would have to change. I think the details would have to be worked out.

You are concentrating understandably at the highest levels, what are now service Chiefs, Unified and Specified Commanders and their immediate subordinates.

There have been cases where the services have nominated somebody to be a CINC and the Secretary of Defense, who always ought to insist on having more than one choice, has picked somebody else.

I think there would be in the situation I am proposing, much more choice exercised directly by the Chief of Military Staff and the Secretary of Defense acting together as opposed to the services in selecting people for the CINC's positions.

Senator NUNN. Would the Chief of Military Staff also from about the O–5 or O–6 level have come up as a purple suiter or do you think you might reach over and grab a service Chief and put him in that?

Secretary BROWN. It could be done either way. I would have to think about career patterns, but I think there could be more than one pattern.

As I say, I think there could be people who turned purple suit who would conceivably on occasion become service Chiefs. Much more often they could become Unified and Specified Commanders and you could have a service Chief who later became a Unified and Specified Commander and later became Chief of the Military Staff.

Senator NUNN. I can see how you would float from service Chief over to the Unified part, but I have a hard time seeing how you would float from purple suit back to service Chief.

If you leave that possibility out, it seems to me the service would still have a very strong hold on everybody. If they don't continue to adhere to the service line, their chances of being service Chief are pretty remote.

Secretary BROWN. I think the transition would be less likely from purple suit to service.

I think the career pattern more likely would go purple suit up to a Specified and Unified Commander. Recall that in the particular proposal that I am making the service Chief would not be a member of the Joint Chiefs.

There wouldn't be a Joint Chiefs and that would, I think, pose more starkly to the O–5 and O–6 who is considering becoming a purple suit, "Okay, which line do I want to take? A Unified and Specified Commander is a pretty attractive role, too."

Senator NUNN. I think everyone would agree this would be a pretty bold step. It goes further than General Jones.

It seems to me that at least indicates that you, yourself, in your experience felt some real void in the structure of military organization and in the resulting guidance you got.

If you look to put it in balance, if you looked at the good things about the present system in terms of you being Secretary of Defense and the advice you received, military advice, and looked at the good

things, question No. 1, and bad things, question No. 2, how would you describe the present system?

What would be a void that you obviously perceive is Secretary of Defense, when you look at the uniformed services?

Secretary BROWN. You have to decide that in two pieces.

One big piece is the whole training, procurement, logistics issues, and support issues. I set those aside because that really is a somewhat separate matter from the organization of the Joint Chiefs. Not entirely, but largely.

Then there is the matter of military advice, how to behave in planning forces, how to decide on priority between theaters of operations, how to behave in the political-military context. That is what I want to deal with now.

Let me say what some of the pluses were. When I dealt with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the five individuals that constituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I found them very wise, very thoughtful on most matters, not all, but on most matters.

Senator NUNN. Individually, you mean?

Secretary BROWN. Individually. The fact that they had long service experience and service responsibilities contributed to that.

To the extent that you would lose that by what I propose, I think that would be a real loss.

When I turn from that the question of what kinds of papers came out of the system and what kind of positions came out of the system, it really is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde situation because what came out then was—again, I don't want to exaggerate—most of the time it was a perfectly adequate, pedestrian output, but on important issues or contentious issues, especially where service interests were involved—either a useless logrolling product, or else downright mischievous by suggesting something that obviously couldn't work.

Senator NUNN. In other words, you got a piece of paper from the joint system and you felt it was the up side, that it was the best case?

Secretary BROWN. In cases where parochial service interests were involved, the result was poor. That is because of the way the system works.

Senator NUNN. In the complex military environment the services have gone to work together on operations. You are talking about a decision in terms of strategy and policy, that kind of thing, as opposed to procurement; is that right?

Secretary BROWN. That is right.

On procurement you always get logrolling. But on operations you would get a situation where the most important thing would be that nobody's ox got gored, that everybody had a piece of the action and that there was no substantial shift in the previously negotiated responsibilities.

Senator NUNN. Would Desert One fit into that category?

Secretary BROWN. It is a little hard to say because the nature of the operation dictated a large part of the multiservice nature of the operation. You had to operate from aircraft carriers. There is no way, therefore, that the Navy wasn't going to be involved.

You had to go a long distance from the sea. Thus, there is no way that the Air Force wasn't going to be involved. In the end, I suppose

you might have left the Army out and done it with Marines and SEAL teams.

But, in fact, the group that had previously been put together for actual rescues had been considered in a much more restricted way, anticipating airplane highjackings, for example. It, therefore, was Army and it was the right group to use. So that to some degree the circumstances dictated that.

Stepping back from it, however, and asking why we didn't organize something that was from the beginning a self-contained unit with its own air assets and its own helicopter assets, there I think you would have to say was, in part, consequence of the service interest being otherwise, but only in part.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Chairman TOWER. Senator Quayle?

Senator QUAYLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It seems to me we have sort of three ideas—status quo, we have General Jones' proposal and now we have the Brown proposal which by far is the most centralized of the three. I perceive it as such.

Secretary BROWN. It centralizes military authority for operations in one place, but it certainly would give those military people a lot more say as compared to what some civilians in the Office of Secretary of Defense now have.

Senator QUAYLE. As far as military operations, it would be more centralized than the three proposals. Is that not an accurate description?

Secretary BROWN. It is an accurate description.

It takes away from the services functions which according to most of the law they don't have, but which other parts of the law allows them to exercise by indirection. In so doing, it centralizes things.

Senator QUAYLE. Each of the service Chiefs under your proposal would be subordinate to the Military Chief of Staff?

Secretary BROWN. No.

Senator QUAYLE. As far as recommendations?

Secretary BROWN. No.

In my proposal they would take on functions that the service Secretaries have.

Senator QUAYLE. What about strategy and planning and procurement?

Secretary BROWN. On procurement certainly not. On procurement they would have more authority. On strategy and planning they would have less authority.

They would have less authority. What authority they have now, of course, is not as service Chiefs. As service Chiefs they have no authority for planning or executing military operations. They have those only as members of the Joint Chiefs.

Senator QUAYLE. How would they have more authority under your proposal?

Secretary BROWN. If they didn't have to go through service Secretaries, they would have more authority on procurement.

Senator QUAYLE. They don't have to go through the service Secretaries?

Secretary BROWN. The most extreme proposal involves eliminating service Secretaries and giving those functions to the Chiefs.

Senator QUAYLE. What would the service Secretaries do under your proposal?

Secretary BROWN. Since they wouldn't exist, they wouldn't do much.

Senator QUAYLE. You would eliminate them completely?

Secretary BROWN. That is the full-blown major change. It is not fully described in my statement, but it is described in the printed material with which you are supplied.

That would save some money, by the way.

Senator QUAYLE. Under your proposal, and this came up yesterday with a couple of our witnesses, a number of personnel not only serve the Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs, but also OSD.

Under your proposal I presume there would be quite a bit fewer personnel?

Secretary BROWN. In principle there ought to be. It never happens quite the way you like.

What I think is that if you made these very sweeping changes, which I must confess I think are unlikely to be implemented, you could probably reduce the size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense because a lot of that is devoted to doing some of the jobs that I think should be done by the combined military staff.

The lower limit on the size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense is set by the size of the congressional staffs, in my judgment. Today, the amount of questioning and work that is generated over here sets a very high lower limit on the size of the Office of the Secretary.

Senator QUAYLE. We had some testimony the other day that we ought to insist more on prototypes before we go to full procurement on weapons.

Do you think this is a good idea and if so, how can we legislate it?

Secretary BROWN. Sometimes it is a good idea, sometimes not. Fly before you buy is an old proposal and in many cases it is a good idea.

In some cases it is just an extra lengthy intermediate process that makes things cost more and take longer. So, I don't think you should legislate something like that. I think sometimes it can be done one way, sometimes another way.

Let me point out, for example, in many systems, some intelligence systems, for example, you have only three or four items. Do you really want to have one in operation for years before you build the other three or four? It doesn't make sense to me.

If you are going to have a very long run of production, then you do want to have a prototype, but in effect you do have a prototype as part of the development program. There isn't any magic solution, I am afraid.

Senator QUAYLE. You don't think there is any useful role that the Congress can play to give the services the incentive to, whenever practical, go along the lines of prototype as far as competition, as far as making sure that the thing will live up to the design before we go through with it?

Secretary BROWN. You are now going further than your previous question.

Senator QUAYLE. A lot of times, at least the testimony yesterday is that we ought to use prototyping more before we get into a situation where we push the Pentagon to go ahead and sign a contract and begin production.

Secretary BROWN. I think if the Congress wants to move in this direction, and there is attraction in what you say, if you now say not only that you ought to have the prototype, but that you ought to have competition, which is a little different, then you ought to consider having the Congress fund the whole program in the beginning and sign off on it.

What you can't do is say, "All right, you are going to have competition and it is going to be judged in a certain way and you are going to, therefore, be more efficient and you are going to lay out milestones," and then mess with it later.

Senator QUAYLE. You say multiyear funding?

Secretary BROWN. I am saying more than multiyear funding. I am saying no change in the program by the Congress merely as a result of what this year's budget is or next year's military pressures are.

It is possible, not always but often I think, to insist on fly before buy through a competition and making a choice, especially if you make a choice on the basis of two prototypes. That cannot be done if either the Congress, or the Office of Management and Budget—with the President supporting OMB—or the Secretary of Defense changes the program every year. That, of course, has become the practice.

Senator QUAYLE. Get agreement between the Congress and Pentagon basically not to change the program, sign off the fixed-cost type of situation and say this is going to be prototyped?

Secretary BROWN. Yes. Then you can do protoypes more easily, I think. It will be very hard to get the Department of Defense to do it that way and I would judge it would be quite a bit harder to get the Congress to do it that way.

Nobody likes to sign off permanently and say, "Okay, I have had my last word on it and I am not going to change my mind."

Senator QUAYLE. The idea is something——

Secretary BROWN. The idea is not a bad one. The most recent one you might have described that way is competition for what became the F–16. There were two airplanes. They went to flight test. The idea originally was that the Air Force and Navy would both buy the same airplane.

The Navy fell out of that program and picked the other one; the loser in the Air Force competition became the winner in the Navy competition and became the F–18.

That is an example in which you got, I would say, two pretty good airplanes.

Senator QUAYLE. There has been some discussion that from a management point of view what we need to do is to give more authority to program managers, people who are in control, say, "Do it, get it done, it is your job, you are responsible and, therefore, take it and go."

Is there something we should be doing to encourage that type of management or is that type of management going in the wrong direction? Should there be more control, oversight from OSD or the Congress?

Secretary BROWN. It is going in the right direction. I say in my testimony that everybody is for it in principle, but it turns out to be very hard to do.

The only programs that I would say have really been carried out like that are highly classified programs where you keep people out of

the act by virtue of very high classification. That means keeping people out of the act from the service headquarters, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, from the Office of Management and Budget and from Congress.

You don't keep them out entirely, but you hold the number down to such a small number that they can't generate all these questions and alternatives, and so forth, that drive program managers crazy.

There have been quite a few successes in this approach to programs, and some flaws, but the record on the whole in terms of meeting schedule, cost, and performance is better than it is on other programs which are exposed to public view.

I will sum up my judgment in a slogan: We have chosen accountability over performance. In other words, we insist on watching by pulling up a plant, looking at the roots, watering it, and so on, so often that nothing grows.

Changes are made almost every day and the attention is very close. When you look back at a program, and I make this criticism even of the 1960's which in retrospect were a lot easier to work in than the 1970's and 1980's were, it turned out, looking back, that you didn't have a 10-year program, what you had was 10 1-year segments of 10 entirely different 10-year programs. The program was changed every year.

Senator QUAYLE. Would you comment on the move to a 2-year budget?

Secretary BROWN. I think that would be a step in the right direction and I think that is what was originally intended. The authorizations were supposed to be for a couple of years and the appropriations were made 1 year at a time.

It has not worked that way. I think going to a 2-year budget would be a big help, but then you would have a $400 billion deficit.

Chairman TOWER. I wish you had not added that last part. Dr. Brown, you have ventured one criticism of the way the Congress intervenes in the management functions of the Department of Defense managing programs. I should like to hear you give us a complete litany of all the things you think Congress had done wrong or does wrong.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I think you ought to give him a time limit on this.

Chairman TOWER. My time is only 10 minutes.

You know we are looking at DOD. We ought to be looking at ourselves, and the impact we have on DOD operations.

Secretary BROWN. Let me preface my remarks, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I think to a great extent these are the inevitable price of democratic and representative government and that they are worth the price.

I mean that they are not too great a price to pay for democratic representative government, but that doesn't mean that the system can't be improved. How it gets improved really goes to the matter of how Congress organizes and functions.

I am not the one to lecture you gentlemen about that. But from the perspective of the Department of Defense the problems do include micromanagement. I gave the example of the House supporting short-wave length infrared lasers, the Senate supporting longwave infrared lasers.

I think that is the right lineup. A lot of it, of course, is micromanaging that the Secretary of Defense's office invites by micromanaging on its own.

Whenever a certain level of government looks at a particular detail, it is almost an invitation for levels above it to do the same thing.

I think that has become enormously worse than it was 20 years ago. I think that is a consequence in part of the great expansion in congressional staffs which are at least four or five times bigger now than they were then.

That in turn was invited by the executive branch. The executive branch tried to monopolize the information and make all the decisions itself just by overpowering the legislative branch by the size of executive department's organization.

Then the legislative branch struck back by increasing its own staff. I think that has made things worse all around.

Let me say that when I arrived in Washington in 1961, there were perhaps 15 or 20 lines in the R&D research and development test and evaluation RDT&E appropriation. I think there must now be at least 500 and probably more.

The same thing, of course, is true in procurement. I can't believe that the result has been an improvement.

The second thing is the annual budgetig process which I think would be improved by going to 2 years, but which somehow again has to be rationalized.

Again, to give you an example, originally the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering appeared only before the Appropriations Committees because R&D was not even authorized in those days.

Since then people at that level in the Department have to appear before the Appropriations Committees, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on both sides, authorizing committees on both sides. They wind up appearing before the Foreign Relations Committees, sometimes Foreign Affiairs Appropriations Subcommittee, and the Budget Committees.

I guess what I am saying is that there has been a fragmentation of authority and overlapping of authority in Congress which quite aside from the question of micromanagement is not conducive to efficiency either in the Congress or in the executive branch.

Let me turn now to the matter of efficiency and legislative actions on efficiency.

I mentioned in my testimony the so-called set-asides which are inserted over and over again by Members of Congress who are all for efficiency, but who do have this other little matter that is of more importance.

Again, it is a result of representative and democratic government and any democratic government, any representative government, exhibits the same phenomenon.

It happens in Japan, it happens in the European countries, not quite as much as it happens here because the separation of powers, constitutional separation of powers, greatly exaggerates its effects on the United States.

Again. I don't need to lecture you about this, Mr. Chairman. You have made the point yourself to your colleagues in a forceful and effective way.

The same thing shows up when it comes time to close a base or when it comes time to change the way in which support functions are done on military bases, and so forth.

There are always perfectly good reasons for Congress to put in a provision saying you shall not subcontract out work, but it does cost the taxpayers money. The difficulty is that all the taxpayers would profit by not having that provision forbidding contracting out put in, but they wouldn't profit very much and they don't know that they would profit at all.

Whereas, there are a few people or a substantial number of people in the local area who will lose a great deal if that happens. They know it very well and they let that be known to their representatives in Congress.

Those are some of the examples. Again, I hope you don't take this, because it is not so meant, as a litany of complaints. It is a list of observations about things that aren't working well. Yet I don't see an easy way to change them without changing the way that the Congress operates and the power structure of the Congress.

I remember a time, as some of you do, certainly Senator Thurmond does, when the executive branch could get approval from the Congress by getting approval from a few people who were accepted by their colleagues as experts on these matters.

That is not true any longer, partly as a result of single issue constituencies, partly as a result of generational change. People who are now in Congress went through the sixties and seventies and do not accept authority, partly for that reason and partly as a result of lots of other things.

That is not the way it is any more. We have gained something. I have pointed out some of the things that we have lost.

Chairman TOWER. I served on this committee when Richard Russell and Everett Saltonstall decided something was going to be done, that was it, that is the way it went.

It doesn't work that way any more, much to the dismay of the chairman and ranking member.

Senator NUNN. I don't know about that.

Chairman TOWER. We are going to have to recess one more time.

Dr. Brown has to leave by 4 p.m. Let me urge the Members to get back as quickly as possible so we can complete our questions.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, I am glad to have you with us. If I don't get back, I have a few questions for you to answer for the record.

Secretary BROWN. I will be glad to accommodate you.

Senator THURMOND. I will be back if I can. I am glad to see you here today.

Secretary BROWN. It is good to see you.

[Recess.]

Senator NUNN [presiding]. Senator Tower will be back in just a moment. He asked me to go ahead and ask a few questions since our witness is going to have to leave in just a few minutes.

Secretary Brown, I think we have been through your proposals not as thoroughly as we would like, but I think we have gotten the essence of them.

Let me ask you a few specific questions that have been proposed by other people. Obviously, we are trying to see if there is a consensus on any of these items and trying to develop our own approach to this important area.

General Rogers named four or five items that he endorsed. Let me give them to you simply. I know that they in some cases would conflict with your overall, comprehensive-type proposals, but if you could give us an indication of your feeling on each one of these specifics.

The first thing he advocated was putting the Chairman of the JCS in the chain of command.

Would you agree or disagree with that one?

Secretary BROWN. I think that would be a good idea. I would like to see it as part of a larger set of changes, but I think it would formalize something that exists now and I would be for it, if the language is right.

Senator NUNN. The next one is having a deputy chairman of the JCS.

Secretary BROWN. I would be for that as well. It doesn't quite fit with what I am talking about because there wouldn't be the chairman of the JCS, but it does duplicate something I said.

I said the Chief of the Military Staff should have a deputy from a complementary service.

I think the same thing should be true even if you change the system less by making the change that General Jones and General Rogers propose.

Senator NUNN. The third was making the Chairman a member of the National Security Council. I think you commented on this in your statement.

Secretary BROWN. I disagree with that.

Senator NUNN. Fourth, giving the Unified and Specified Commanders more of a formalized voice on the Defense Resources Board.

Secretary BROWN. I would agree with that, but I am not quite sure how to do it.

I think the chairman really ought to serve that role. I think there are too many people on the DRB already and to add seven or eight more doesn't make sense to me, but somebody should speak for them and I think it ought to be the chairman.

Senator NUNN. Finally, improve and strengthen the Joint Staff.

Secretary BROWN. How can anybody be against that?

Senator NUNN. I agree.

A few suggestions by former Deputy Secretary Dave Packard along a little bit different line. Let me pose these to you to see what you think of them.

First, in his summary he says the Office of the Secretary of Defense should be restructured to pay more attention to the establishment of military requirements to support national policy and less attention to detailed decisionmaking on military procurement.

Secretary BROWN. I would support that.

Whenever you do something by legislation, though, there are dangers. So, I would urge that you don't just say there shall be an Assistant Secretary for Requirements.

Senator NUNN. The second one, that the JCS should be restructured to eliminate present logrolling service involvement in establishing military requirements.

Secretary BROWN. I am certainly for that. I think my proposal would do that with a vengeance.

Senator NUNN. I agree. The third, the services should be restructured to insure that well-trained managers are put in charge of major procurement. They must be given the necessary authority and responsibility and these people should be given just as much incentive for good performance as is given for being a good commander of military operations.

He went on to say in essence that you should separate the procurement function from the command function and you should develop a cadre of procurement specialists that would stay in that area with brief interchanges to keep their feet wet, so to speak, in the operations area.

Secretary BROWN. I am for that. I think that there are risks to it, but by and large I think it would be better than the system we have.

I think probably the Air Force comes closest to doing that now and I think as a result they often do a better job.

Senator NUNN. They do it by a joint military-civilian. They keep a permanent civilian guy as the alter ego of every military commander in the logistics area.

Is that what you are talking about?

Secretary BROWN. I think there is a fairly clear chain nearly to the top in the Air Force. Not a chain perhaps, but a career route nearly to the top just by sticking to R&D and procurement matters. In the Navy, for example, that is much more difficult. None of the services really do provide a purely research-development-procurement career pattern to the very top of that activity.

Senator NUNN. Fourth, the Unified and Specified Commanders should be involved with the JCS and OSD in establishing military requirements?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, I agree with that.

Senator NUNN. Fifth——

Secretary BROWN. Excuse me. But you have to be careful. If you are not careful, what will happen is that you will just get the service proposal coming through the component command to the CINC and rubber stamped all the way back to the JCS.

What you have in that case is simply the same old stuff with a lot more authority attached to it so that it would be harder to question.

If it is really a genuine input from a commander as a user, I am for it. If it is just a rubber stamp reinforcing a service proposal, I am against it.

Senator NUNN. To make sure it is independent, you would probably have to do a lot more purple suiting than you talked about?

Secretary BROWN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Fifth, the Secretary's role should be restructured to minimize their staffs' involvement in procurement decisions. Their role should not be strengthened in any way that requires more staff.

I think he more specifically said that the staff of the Secretaries of the services should be eliminated and they should be fed from the same spoon as the service.

Secretary BROWN. In the printed material which has been distributed there is a modified version of my proposal for abolishing the service Secretary. It says we could reduce the senior staff to the service Secretary to one senior assistant. That assistant could be called an under or an assistant secretary.

The latter is the way it used to be in the days of Teddy Roosevelt and Franklin Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In that case, the same staff would serve the service Chief and the service Secretary.

That is essentially what Dave Packard is suggesting there. That is a milder version of the "Abolish Service Secretaries" approach.

Senator NUNN. The final, almost any restructuring of the Department of Defense that will reduce the number of people involved in the procurement process will improve its performance.

That was more or less a general observation. I think you share that?

Secretary BROWN. I do, but that means the amount of second-guessing from the outside has to be reduced, too.

I don't know whether the chicken or the egg comes first here. I am afraid neither of them.

Senator NUNN. What if we just went blank with all procurement programs?

Secretary BROWN. That would be quite a trick if you could do it.

Senator NUNN. I think that would be the tendency.

Secretary BROWN. I actually fear if those numbers will get large enough, there will be a push to declassify everything.

Senator NUNN. As you observe, my program seems to work better, less checks and balances.

Secretary BROWN. Less accountability.

Senator NUNN. Well, maybe more accountability in one or two people.

Secretary BROWN. In the end there would be more accountability with that approach.

Senator NUNN. That is spreading of the accountability.

Mr. Chairman, I know our witness has to leave. I have gone through the questions I have. I have a lot more, but I know he has to leave. I will defer the rest of my time to you.

Chairman TOWER. Thanks a lot.

[Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. You are welcome.

Chairman TOWER. I notice the clock shows 4 p.m.

I have additional questions I would like to ask Dr. Brown. I am sure the rest of you have, too. But I promised to get him out of here at 4 p.m.

I do appreciate very much your working us into your schedule and giving us very constructive suggestions, albeit some rather provocative ones. I am inclined to agree with you that we are not going to be able to achieve reform overnight. It will probably be an evolutionary process, but I hope we can make a start on it in this Congress.

Senator Nunn pledges his cooperation and I hope we can come up with something in a bipartisan way that will make thorough and worthwhile reforms that seem to be the concensus among those who know defense.

I want to thank you again, Dr. Brown, and we will probably want to call on you for advice and consultation from time to time while we are in the process of formulating some kind of reform.

Secretary BROWN. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You and Senator Nunn, of course, know I will be available for consultation to help you whenever you wish.

Chairman TOWER. Thank you very much.

Secretary BROWN. Thank you.

[The questions submitted by members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be answered by Dr. Harold Brown, follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY CHAIRMAN JOHN TOWER, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY DR. HAROLD BROWN

SERVICE SECRETARIES AND CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY

Chairman TOWER. One might conclude from Chapter 12 of your book, "Thinking About National Security," that you favor the more streamlined option for the Military Departments which would eliminate the Service Secretaries and Secretariats.

In his testimony before the Committee, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman argued that the Service Secretaries are an important element of civilian control of the military.

Do you, based upon your experience as a Service Secretary, see any weakening of civilian control resulting from an elimination of the Service Secretaries?

Secretary BROWN. Not so long as the Secretary of Defense remains strong, as an office and as a person. As I indicated earlier, the most important aspect of civilian control is that dealing with operation of the forces, the command chain for which does not run through the Secretaries of the Military Departments. On other matters (training, procurement, logistics, military bases, etc.) they are involved, and can be a factor in civilian control. Their effect can be helpful or unhelpful, depending on whether the Secretaries of the Military Departments are mouthpieces and amplifiers for their Services, or perform a genuine two-way communication function that adds intellectual, leadership, and policy content. In my view, the risk of loss of civilian control that would accompany abolition of those offices is less than the expectation of gain by the elimination of an intermediate level.

CHAIN OF COMMAND

Chairman TOWER. In your statement, you raise some concerns about the language of the House bill on JCS reorganization that would place the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the chain of command.

Is your concern about the language of the House bill or the concept of placing the Chairman in the chain of command?

Secretary BROWN. My concern is with the language by which that is done, and the possibility that such language could be used to circumvent the Secretary of Defense. I would add that, as a matter of gaining support among military people for a significant change in the present system, I would advise putting the CJCS in the chain of command by law *only* as part of a more significant package of change.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND, ANSWERS SUPPLIED BY DR. HAROLD BROWN

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brown, in testimony this morning, Dr. Brzezinski advocated creating a Strategic Planning Board within the National Security Council to formulate long-range strategic objectives.

Would you give us your opinion of this concept?

Secretary BROWN. As a concept, it has appeal. How well it would work in practice is less clear. Such groups already exist in the State Department (Policy Planning Staff) and Defense Department (in the Office of the Undersecretary for Policy). The problem has been the competition for attention by immediate crises. That pressure is even stronger in the White House than in the Departments.

Senator THURMOND. Dr. Brzezinski also pointed out in his testimony that the makeup of the rescue force for the 1980 rescue mission was dictated by the demands that each service be allowed to participate. The impact of that decision is well known.

Do you feel that service rivalry plays too significant a role in our defense planning?

Secretary BROWN. Without fully accepting the assertion given as an example (the nature of the mission played an important role in the makeup of the force), I would say yes to your question.

Senator THURMOND. Former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified recently that the likelihood of U.S. involvement in a conventional war is marginal. He stated that operations like Grenada, the Iranian hostage rescue attempt and so-called "wars of national liberation" will be our primary threats.

Do you agree or disagree and why?

Secretary BROWN. Those are the more likely threats. But they are less threatening to U.S. vital interests than are some others. And they are less likely only because (and so long as) the more severe ones are deterred by our capabilities, especially our military capabilities. Therefore the U.S. needs capabilities across the board (strategic forces, forces for Europe, the Far East, and Southwest Asia, as well as the kinds of contingencies you mention). The issue is how to distribute resources among those various capabilities. I would agree with the implication of your question that a larger fraction of our future efforts should be aimed at lower intensity threat levels than has been the case in the past.

Senator THURMOND. How would you best realine current roles and missions to best use our resources and best prepare for conflict?

Secretary BROWN. I can give some examples. They have less to do with reallocation among services than with organization of combat and support activities in connection with operations.

(a) Combine MAC, MTMC, and MSC into a unified transportation command.

(b) In military combat operations, establish a single ground commander, a single air commander, and a single commander of naval vessels.

(c) Establish a single medical service.

Chairman TOWER. The committee will now proceed to other business.

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the committee proceeded to other business.]

APPENDIX

12

Organizing and Reorganizing for National Security

U.S. national security rests on, among other elements, military strength, economic programs, and diplomatic efforts. The political, managerial, and financial resources available for these efforts will always be limited. In principle, one way to improve U.S. national security for any given level of resources is to reorganize the way the government formulates and carries out national security policy. Many such efforts have been made, through legislation and through executive branch reorganization. Moreover, Congress has altered its own procedures. Some of these changes have been improvements but some have not.

In defining and executing national security policy the government acts within three major sets of organizational relationships: the executive branch with the legislative branch; the President and White House staff with the executive departments and agencies; and the offices within each of the various executive departments.

CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Congressional procedures in the past fifteen years have changed most notably in staffing patterns and in committee functions. Congressional staff personnel are about four times as numerous as they were in the mid-1960s. The expansion was in part an understandable reaction to the previous situation, in which executive branch officials had maintained a monopoly on detailed information and expertise. The legislators in Congress found it difficult to compete with the executive,

and the subdivision of their attention among a growing variety of issues lost them the advantages of their lengthier tenure. Congressional committees accordingly now examine individual national security programs in much greater detail, whether they deal with weapons or foreign policy. The result has been an increase in Congressional oversight and thus in the degree of executive branch accountability. It is doubtful that this has improved the efficiency or effectiveness of either branch of the government.

Senior policymakers in the executive branch—in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and other agencies—now spend much more time testifying before Congressional committees and answering detailed questions prepared by Congressional staffers but asked by individual legislators. Members of the Senate and the House have no more time to attend to the details of these matters than they had before. They are elected to office to serve a variety of political interests, not to act as executives; so it is no surprise that their staffs are not organized to produce a smooth evolution of consistent foreign or defense policy positions, even for the individual legislator. The legislators themselves are responsible to their constituencies for their actions, but one legislator is almost never the final individual decider of an issue. As one vote among 535, he or she is unlikely to be held accountable for the consequences of the legislation itself. Moreover, the authority of party leaders and committee chairmen within Congress has weakened greatly over the last two decades, so each Senator and Representative must be negotiated with separately. The Congressional staffer is much less accountable than the executive branch policymaker or even a low-level bureaucrat and need not know much about some military subject or program to be *the* expert among Congressional staffs.

Congress not only examines but also legislates foreign and defense policy and programs at a much more detailed level. For example, Congress now reserves the right to veto military sales to foreign countries. Reasonably enough, the responsibility for initiating that veto process has been assigned to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In fact, no major military assistance sale has been rejected, but negotiations between the United States and foreign governments on these matters now have an invisible third party (or rather, 535 of them) present. Again accountability is improved, and unjustified and careless executive branch actions are inhibited; unfortunately, necessary foreign assistance and military equipment transfers have also been made more difficult.

Congress passed the Budget Impoundment and Control Act of

1974 to force President Nixon to make expenditures for domestic programs that had been voted by Congress. The act also forced Congress itself to make an overall decision, in a "budget resolution," on tax revenues, entitlement programs contained in authorizing legislation, the appropriations of individual departments, and the resulting effects on the economy. Supervision of just these concerns is what the Office of Management and Budget is supposed to do in the executive branch. As usual, things did not work out as simply as Congress intended. The budget resolution process gradually gained strength through the late 1970s as the congressional budget committees and the resolutions they pushed through Congress came to have more and more effect on individual authorizations and appropriations. The budget reconciliation process also began to affect revenue and entitlement legislation. Often the government was forced to operate for long periods of time on continuing resolutions. In its consideration of those resolutions Congress as a whole assumed the functions that it had previously delegated to the authorizing and appropriating committees. Those committees, bested in the struggle to control overall budget totals for domestic programs and defense, turned to closer micromanagement of individual departmental budgets, in part in an attempt to compensate for authority lost to other Congressional power centers.

In 1981 President Reagan successfully used the budget reconciliation process to force a single up or down vote on his proposed budget and tax legislation, threatening to veto any substantially different programs, an action that would have brought the government's functioning to a standstill. This showed that the process can be used to give a powerful and popular President the last word. This procedure is unlikely to work more than once for a given administration or session of Congress, but it does highlight the need for the legislative branch to find some way to make modifications in executive programs—domestic and economic as well as national security programs—without failing into one of two traps. The first trap is getting into so much detail that a coherent program is impossible. The second is making policy changes the individual parts of which (defense, taxes, entitlements) Congress approves but the consequences of which (deficits) it is unwilling to take responsibility for. Of course, Presidents must avoid the same traps, but their responsibility is clearly fixed.

Two additional examples of Congressional limitations on executive authority in foreign policy and national security matters are the laws covering covert action and the War Powers Act. Both have restricted or inhibited executive branch actions on occasion, but in fact they represent the limits that U.S. public opinion now sets on the nature

and length of any U.S. combat involvement or covert activities in foreign countries. A determined President, confident of public support for his foreign and military policies, will not be unduly hampered by the present laws and practices.

A reorganization of Congress delineating committee responsibilities more clearly, reducing overlaps, increasing the authority and responsibility of the leadership, and reducing the size of staffs would produce more coherent national policies and legislation. But that seems even less likely than the comparable changes that Congress frequently urges on the executive branch.

WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

National security policy has diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, and domestic political components. It must therefore be formulated by several executive agencies, individually and through interagency coordinating procedures. When there are differing views among the agency heads, and for sufficiently important matters even when they agree, the President must make the decision. With the agency heads, the President's national security staff develops criteria for what issues must be taken to the President and frames those issues for decision. Both in the interagency consultations and in the interactions of agency heads with the President and the White House staff, personalities will inevitably play an important role. This factor makes it difficult to lay down hard and fast procedures.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (also known as the National Security Adviser) heads the staff of the National Security Council (NSC) and must do more than just ensure that differing agency views are debated and where necessary brought to the President for decision. He should also offer his own advice, given from the standpoint of one who represents the President's (and, one hopes, the nation's) interest and who has an overarching viewpoint rather than the particular functional perspective created by the departmental bureaucratic pressures that inevitably influence the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency heads.

But the effectiveness of the National Security Adviser in offering advice, as well as in coordinating interagency activities and in ensuring that Presidential decisions are in fact implemented, is determined by whether he acts to facilitate decision making or is seen as an independent player. In this regard appearances, press conferences, and "backgrounders" are usually unnecessary and can even be counterproductive. They should occur rarely and then only with explicit and specific Presidential approval, usually when the President

wants something said but for some reason cannot or should not say it himself and does not want the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense to issue the statement.

The President must also make decisions that weigh the foreign aspects of national security (military and diplomatic) in the balance with economic and domestic political considerations (including those that also affect national security) and adjudicate between the differing views and perspectives of his domestic political advisers and his advisers on foreign and defense policy.

It may be possible to make organizational improvements to aid the President in this task. Making economic advice a recognized component in national security policymaking would be an important step. But that will not be easy. The governmental structure does not provide a single preeminent economic adviser for the President, as it does a foreign policy, a defense, and an intelligence adviser. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) all have a clear claim, and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has a major effect. Moreover all of the domestic agencies—the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, Commerce, Health and Human Services, and so on—not only represent domestic constituencies but are likely to have views on the economy as a whole. Each President should select a single agency head to be the principal adviser on economic affairs as they relate to foreign policy and national security policy. Presumably the principal adviser will usually be the Secretary of the Treasury, although it might be the Director of OMB or the Chairman of the CEA. The economic expertise of the NSC staff should also be strengthened.

The White House staff will have to deal with the effects of national security on domestic politics and of domestic politics on national security. It would help if the President were to designate a single person to be the preeminent adviser on the interaction of domestic policy and national security policy. Assuming that the National Security Adviser reports directly to the President, that top adviser on domestic interactions ought to be the President's chief of staff—the senior adviser for everything else.

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary of Defense

A Secretary of Defense has a variety of responsibilities. Some of these are mutually reinforcing and some are conflicting. His first task is to advise the President on and to manage for him the military

aspects of national security policy. The Secretary of Defense must inevitably be part of a national security team. He plays the leading role in defining military policy, as the Secretary of State does in defining foreign policy. But foreign and military policy are closely connected, so the Secretary of Defense and, under his direction, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) influence foreign policy, and the Secretary of State influences military strategy and programs.

The Secretary of Defense, for example, appropriately advises the President about the probable effects on the U.S.-Soviet military balance if the United States and its allies tighten or loosen restrictions on transfers of technology to the Soviets. The Secretary of State would, however, usually take the lead in formulating and negotiating such a policy. The Secretary of Defense can comment on a recommendation that the United States distance itself from, say, some East Asian nation whose internal policies are distasteful, in light of the effect such a policy would have on U.S. security in the Far East. Correspondingly, the Secretary of State can make recommendations on the deployment of weapons systems, e.g., enhanced radiation weapons, to allied countries in the light of the effects of the proposed deployments on U.S. relations with those allies. He can also assess the effect than changes in U.S. fleet-deployment levels in the Far East will have on Japanese attitudes or on how proposed deployment modes for U.S. land-based ICBMs are likely to affect European attitudes toward accepting U.S. land-based nuclear weapons. But in such cases, the primary responsibility for formulating and implementing these defense policies rests with the Secretary of Defense. Depending on the President's interests and on the state of world and domestic affairs, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, other White House staff members and advisers, and the Director of Central Intelligence will also play major roles in both kinds of national security decisions.

A second responsibility of the Secretary of Defense is to act as the President's deputy in the military chain of command. For example, the Secretary of Defense approves, or returns for modification, requests from the Joint Chiefs of Staff for authority to move military units—even a single aircraft or ship. He also approves plans drawn up by the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff in Omaha for the use of U.S. strategic forces in case of a nuclear war.

A third major function of the Secretary of Defense is to manage the Department of Defense—an enterprise that spends more than $200 billion a year—with all the major domestic political effects and pressures that engenders. The Secretary determines, subject to Presidential approval and to very considerable congressional review (1)

policies for procuring and awarding contracts for military systems; (2) the number and location of military bases; and (3) regulations for the recruitment, training, and compensation of personnel. Industry, families of service personnel, and Congress all have special interests at stake in these decisions.

Thus, in connection with his duties, the Secretary of Defense often finds himself communicating with the public, the press, Congress, and also foreign governments and publics—sometimes persuading, sometimes bargaining.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense must be familiar with the ideas and views of numerous interested parties and constituencies—domestic and foreign, political and bureaucratic. He must build a consensus about defense policy across the widest possible range of those perspectives. A corresponding task exists for most senior government officials, but the Secretary of Defense has one of the most difficult, given the differences in perspective of the various Military Services, the differences between military and civilian officials, and the variety of interests—domestic, foreign, economic, and budgetary—involved in defense issues. The difficulties of building such a consensus are greatly compounded by the bureaucratic process and by individual personalities. Nevertheless, a substantial degree of consensus on policy can be established within the Department of Defense, given reasonably effective leadership.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)

Every Secretary of Defense must make a choice—or rather, his personality makes it for him—about the degree to which he and his immediate assistants will run the day-to-day operations of the Department. Both a hands-on and a hands-off management style are workable, and the practice tends to shift from one to the other every five years or so.

Probably the greatest single innovation in managerial style and organization since the Military Departments were subordinated in 1949 to the Secretary of Defense took place in the early 1960s when Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) Charles Hitch instituted a formal planning, programming, and budgeting system (PPBS).

PPBS is a system that, in a highly idealized description, operates as follows. First, the Secretary of Defense and the JCS decide on a military strategy. Then PPBS determines the optimum force structure to carry out the chosen military strategy or plan. It devises a five-year program to produce and maintain those forces in the most cost-effective way, revising the program annually and rolling it forward

one more year. Then it budgets annual increments of the program. PPBS compares alternative forces by objective rather than by military service and uses overall program costs, including maintenance and personnel, rather than initial acquisition costs alone. An office of systems analysis (now called Program Analysis and Evaluation) carries out the corresponding studies.

This was the first example of such a system in the U.S. government, although it had been prefigured to some degree in the Department of Defense (DOD) itself during the tenure of Secretary Thomas Gates (1959–1961). PPBS remains in use. It has spread throughout the government, even while its prophets, the Systems Analysis Office in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, have sometimes seemed to be without honor in their own country and have seen their own numbers and influence wax and wane.

Since 1959, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (now the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering) has exercised strong staff supervision over the development and acquisition of major systems. But much more attention needs to be paid to the mechanics of acquiring weapons systems and materiel, both in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Military Services. The problems of high costs, delays, and unsuitable products are largely traceable to the lack of personal responsibility and accountability on the part of anyone for any particular weapons program as a whole. Instead, overly detailed military specifications are drawn up for standard items, piles of documentation accumulate that no one looks at but that protect procurement officers when Congress starts investigating, and lengthy and repeated reviews settle nothing. All of these contribute to the problem rather than to the solution. The best evidence for this thesis is the relative success of programs carried out at a high level of secrecy, e.g., the U-2, the SR-71, various satellite programs, and the "stealth" aircraft programs. In these cases, very few individuals in the Military Services, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in the Office of Management and Budget, or in Congress—and none in the public or in the press—knew about the programs until they were well along, sometimes even until after they were deployed. Documentation in such cases is minimal, decisions are made and approved by a small number of people, program managers have long tenure, and personnel and overhead are minimized—in part for security reasons.

Such expedited procedures are almost by definition not possible for the entire defense development and production program. For one thing, such an approach demands outstandingly capable, and correspondingly rare, people. But the much better record of highly

classified programs suggests that modifying the overall development and procurement system along those lines would be a great improvement. Whether such a modification is feasible is uncertain, for the American public, press, and Congress have come to demand accountability in great detail and extremely quickly.

The position of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, created in 1977, has staff responsibility for the interaction of foreign policy and defense policy, for planning, and for helping the Secretary of Defense evaluate the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military strategy and operations. The Secretary of Defense also needs a small operational staff to review the adequacy of military contingency plans. The best way would be to share such a staff with the Chairman of the JCS.

The Military Services

Any organization as large as the Department of Defense must be divided into major operating units, with appropriate authority delegated to them. Historically, having an Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines has made considerable sense. Each service has definable functions, and the land, sea, and air environments differ sufficiently to call for differing skills, experience, and sometimes even equipment. The morale and esprit in the military have largely come from service identifications. Recruiting, training, and personnel functions up to a certain level are clearly best carried out in such a structure. Attempts to substitute for service identification some general professional military identification, or a functional identification that would go with the activities of particular unified or specified commands, are unlikely to work as well.

Nevertheless, the division into four military services has led to some large and wasteful overlaps. The most obvious is the maintenance of four separate tactical air forces. Others include separate medical services, separate development and procurement of communications equipment, competing public relations organizations, and duplication of expensive military bases and facilities.

Service divisions have increasingly contributed to operational difficulties. In Vietnam, for example, the air war was directed in part by the theater commander in Vietnam, in part by the Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces in Hawaii. U.S. Army and Air Force units in Europe have difficulty communicating because their systems were developed separately and are not interoperable. Because the Navy and the Air Force use different refueling equipment, tanker aircraft of one cannot refuel fighters of the other without an equipment change. Until recently, even that option was not available. Each

service has its own model of transport helicopters, and crews are generally not cross-trained.

Conflicts also exist over service roles and missions. The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force all see a role for themselves in space systems and operations; these ambitions compete. Both the Navy and the Air Force operate parts of the strategic deterrent forces. The Army and the Marines have differing views on which service should take the lead in providing the ground forces for the Rapid Deployment Force. The services themselves cannot eliminate the waste, correct the operational difficulties, or resolve the conflicts over roles and missions. Efforts by civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense to resolve them, through procurement decisions or new ideas about strategy and tactics, are better than nothing. But they are not nearly so appropriate as military efforts to that end, in the JCS, for example, and their Joint Staff. Unfortunately, those bodies as now constituted are unable to resolve such issues.

Two major organizational issues in the Department of Defense require attention. These are the role of the Military Departments and the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Military Department (or Service) Secretariats are intended to ensure civilian supremacy and to insulate the Service Chiefs from political pressures from Congress and the public. Sometimes the Secretariats are able to carry out these tasks; the key is the relationship the Service Secretary (the man in the middle) has with the Service Chief and with the Secretary of Defense. In some cases the Service Secretary has actually increased the service pressures on the Secretary of Defense and his immediate staff in the OSD. In recent years Assistant Secretaries of the Military departments have often been appointed from the ranks of Congressional staffers in an attempt to cement departmental relations with Congress. Unfortunately, this practice has increased the likelihood of Service Secretariats' trying to bypass the Secretary of Defense in dealing with Congress. The insulation fails, and short circuits result, as the former Congressional staffers revert to their earlier loyalties.

To reduce the number of levels in an overly layered managerial structure, it would be desirable to eliminate the Service Assistant Secretaries and to combine the staffs of the Service Secretary and the Service Chief into a single staff serving both. The Service Secretariat would then include only the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and a total staff of four or five professionals. A more streamlined option would eliminate the Service Secretaries altogether, vesting most of their functions in the Service Chiefs and the rest in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. This could make sense if the Service Chiefs

were severed completely from their JCS responsibilities. Then the chain-of-command and combat functions (planning and operations) could be separated from the support functions of personnel, training, development, and procurement. If a less sweeping revision of the present JCS structure is adopted, the retention of a modest Service Secretariat is appropriate.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Service Chiefs who now, together with the Chairman, constitute the JCS, have a built-in and insuperable conflict of interest. They have individual responsibility for running their services and confront strong internal pressures to fight for their service interests. They are also expected to provide joint military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense on political-military issues and operational military planning. But the Chairman of the JCS has no power of decision and commands no forces. In fact, he does not even command the Joint Staff.

Service Chiefs must spend so much time running their services that on interservice issues, and especially political-military issues, their reliance on subordinates is great. Those subordinates, who depend for their promotions on the approval of their immediate service superiors, are unlikely to advise the Army Chief of Staff to assign a high priority to defending air bases with Army surface-to-air missiles or to go along with a plan to have British units serve that function for U.S. Air Force bases in Britain. Nor is the Air Force Chief of Staff likely to support Navy suggestions for sealift increases unless the Chief of Naval Operations supports the Air Force's airlift program.

Preparations for military operations, including command arrangements, logistics, and plans, must go through an elaborate interservice procedure. This sytem has its advantages: The interrelationships in a combined operation are examined beforehand, and different perspectives are advanced. But the result is often the lowest-common-denominator resolution of differences in service positions, adding together requests rather than making hard choices either between services or between operational theaters. It is easier, for example, to assume that enough airlift and sealift will somehow be available for multiple contingencies than to face up in advance to the difficult choice as to which front will get priority. And when the Joint Chiefs do face the fact that the requirements will exceed the available lift capacity, their peacetime compromises are likely to be the wrong ones for wartime exigencies.

A variety of views, backgrounds, and experiences must be brought

to bear on military advice. Experience across the boundaries of land, naval, and air forces is rare. The President and the Secretary of Defense therefore need a senior interservice advisory body. The JCS, if it is to give coherent advice and to take an effective position reflecting professional military views, should not be a collective body. By far the best solution would be to have a Chief of Military Staff (with a deputy from the naval forces if he is an Army or Air Force officer, or vice versa) and a Joint General Staff drawn from all the services but responsible *to him alone*. He should have the principal authority for promotions on that staff. Some movement back and forth between the general staff and the service staffs would be possible, but obviously there would be a difference in career paths—some officers choosing or being chosen to remain largely within their services, others following a career path of joint service except for occupying, on occasion, some very senior positions in the service in which they were commissioned.

Such an approach would be an attempt to introduce a clearer and less parochial military view on issues of military strategy and capabilities, and the relationship between the two. It would provide a means to clarify roles and missions and to improve the procedure for establishing the requirements for operational capabilities. A General Staff would be able to review, compare, and suggest changes in the plans of commanders with different geographical or functional responsibilities and to decide among their competing demands for limited combat resources. Decisions would be less likely to be influenced by (or go unmade because of) questions of whether individual unified and specified commanders are from one service or another, whether the functions are oriented toward one service or another, or how the decisions would affect service roles, missions, opportunities, futures, and personalities. The President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress would be able to get much clearer and more accountable military advice than they get now—if they want it. U.S. military planning and strategy would become more responsive to the changed needs of military operations and to complex political-military situations.

The Service Chiefs would continue to have responsibility for structuring, equipping, and training their services. They would make budget recommendations on behalf of their services through their Service Secretaries. But they would no longer make recommendations in a separate chain under JCS auspices. The Chief of Military Staff would make an overall budget recommendation, including a ranking of priorities from among the programs of the different services. He

would also review budget decisions and their implications for joint operations.

What is proposed here is to separate those charged with training and procurement (the Service Chiefs) from those charged with strategy and operations. The Chief of Military Staff and the Joint General Staff would provide not a second channel for service inputs but a separate perspective on these matters. It is notable that such a structure and military posts (whatever their names) already exist in so disparate a collection of nations as Great Britain, Canada, West Germany, France, and the Soviet Union.

Are there drawbacks to this Chief of Military Staff–Joint General Staff approach? Surely. It does tend to create an elite group, and strains between that group and the operational forces would be inevitable. Operational commanders at the high level, however, already have multiservice responsibilities and should prefer getting their guidance from a General Staff alone to receiving additional informal but influential pressures from service headquarters. This proposal will not necessarily resolve the problems of, or bring a clear and unique military insight to, choices among weapons systems or procurement levels. And there is a risk in not having at the top levels of the General Staff some of the immediate service experience involved in training, weapons development and procurement, and service doctrine that the Service Chiefs now provide in the JCS.

General David Jones, the recently retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has proposed a more modest modification of the present JCS system. This would give the Chairman—who would be provided with a deputy—more authority. The Chairman would replace the JCS as a group in their role as principal military adviser to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. The Service Chiefs would continue as members of the JCS. In that role they would advise the Chairman, and each would be given a small interservice staff for that purpose. The present participation of the service staffs in JCS matters, where they effectively have a veto at each of four steps, would disappear. The Joint Staff would be responsible to the Chairman alone. He would have influence in the promotions of officers assigned to the Joint Staff, and they in turn would be allowed to serve longer in those assignments. This proposal is a reasonable way to begin. But it would not fundamentally alter the dual responsibilities of the Service Chiefs.

One concern about any JCS reform is frequently expressed, but in my judgment it has no substance. This is that it will produce something analogous to the German General Staff and threaten democratic principles. The problem with the German General Staff

in World War I—which was an army staff rather than a joint staff—was not that one service dominated the others; it was, at least in that war, that it dominated the civilian authority. In World War II the German General Staff probably had too little capability to plan or direct combined operations—for example, the Luftwaffe, through Göring, remained a political force on its own. A Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or a Chief of Military Staff, is no more likely to dominate civilians than is a committee.

A more legitimate question is whether divergent views would be suppressed. Though that possibility will always exist—as it does now—a Secretary of Defense or a President can see to it that alternative choices are presented and can reach down into the services, or to the Unified and Specified Commands, to get dissenting views. Enforced conformity of view is much less likely in a Joint General Staff than within a specific military service. Strong traditions and a sense of cohesion and community make the headquarters staff of a military service more monolithic than any other organizational unit of the U.S. military. Plenty of argument goes on, but it is kept inside.

A reform of the JCS would have several additional benefits. First, it would almost certainly greatly improve the quality of the Joint Staff. That is not to say that the present Joint Staff is of poor quality. It is composed of fine officers. The real stars among the lieutenant colonels, colonels, commanders, and Navy captains, however, are guarded jealously by the individual services. Thus, though the Joint Staff gets its full share of good officers, it probably gets less than its share of the very best. This, almost as much as the existence of service vetoes during the formulation of JCS positions on policy or operations, affects the quality of all Joint Staff work, most importantly their operational planning and their review of the plans of the unified and specified commanders.

Second, military officers in such a Joint General Staff could take over many of the current roles of the OSD staff. Civilian analysts in the Department of Defense have been making military recommendations for more than twenty-five years, and they will undoubtedly continue to do so, no matter what organizational changes are made. But the degree to which their recommendations are accepted over those of military staffs will depend on how well-conceived and responsive the recommendations of the military staffs are, both to the situation and to the needs of civilian decision makers. In principle, the best recommendations would come from a joint military staff or from teams of military officers and civilians, with the military officers usually in charge of those teams. Under present arrangements the JCS organization and the Joint Staff cannot meet the above tests for

quality of recommendations. Secretaries of Defense have, therefore, turned to civilian staffs in the Office of International Security Affairs and in the Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation to get policy and planning advice whose content comprises at least as much of military as of political or technical matters or of international relations.

Usually, but not always, Secretaries of Defense have also turned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a personal adviser. This has inevitably caused the Chairman problems with his colleagues on the JCS and forced him to rely on a staff of four or five—a special assistant and a Chairman's special staff group. He uses the Joint Staff as well, to whatever degree is feasible with a Joint Staff that reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a group. All joint staff actions are also monitored and influenced at every step by the staffs of the Military Services.

A third reason for such a change would be to improve the interactions of the Joint Chiefs or of any successor organization with the unified and specified commanders. Almost all modern military operations are joint operations and have been since World War II. Today reconnaissance and target acquisition and designation are largely done from the air or even from space. The ranges of manned and unmanned attack vehicles—ballistic or aerodynamic, launched from land or from the sea—are much larger than they were before. Land and sea battles are now strongly influenced, if not dominated, by control of the air; and air and sea forces require land bases. For all these reasons, the operational commands charged with planning and executing combat operations require a much closer integration of the different services than was necessary in the past, even in World War II. Some of these Unified and Specified Commands are functional and involve only a single service (the specified commands—the Strategic Air Command and the Military Airlift Command); others are geographically defined and tend to be dominated either by naval forces (the Atlantic and Pacific commands) or by ground and ground-based air forces (the European command).

In every case, the unified commanders in the field should have greater control over their component service commands, which now respond more to service headquarters staffs in the Pentagon. The unified and specified commanders (CINCs) should also play more of a role in defining military requirements and budgets and in the initial planning for military contingencies. The Chief of Military Staff, using the Joint General Staff, should then review and balance the plans of the CINCs, reconciling them within limited resources, ensuring their compatibility with overall operational plans for various single-theater or multitheater contingencies, and evaluating them in light

of international political considerations. Then, ideally, the CINCs' plans would be redrawn to be compatible with all those constraints, or the constraints would be adjusted where possible.

If these radical JCS and military service reorganizations make sense, why have not previous DOD administrations (specifically my own) put them forward? The answer is simple: Ripeness is all. Such changes are best proposed by either a departing or a recently departed administration, which cannot be accused of self-aggrandizement. They also require the informed support of the incumbent administration. All the organizational changes I have discussed are feasible, given an administration that is strong enough and a modicum of acceptance in the Congress. But until now they have not had a high enough political priority when that political strength was present. The 1980s are a good time to move at least some distance in these directions.

13

Managing the Department of Defense

The Congress established the Department of Defense in 1947, incorporating and reorganizing the elements of the old War Department and Navy Department. The experience of World War II and the immediate postwar years provided much of the impetus. One goal of the reorganization was to integrate the military policy of the United States more closely with its foreign policy, a task that could be more effectively addressed by a single, central, civilian management of the various armed forces and their activities. A second goal was certainly to address the perceived need for efficiency of operation. This was to be done by avoiding waste and duplication and applying sensible business practices in procurement and in other areas where they could reasonably be expected to save the taxpayer money. The original Congressional hearings on the legislation establishing the Department of Defense (DOD), the legislation itself, and the testimony on and text of the amendments that have since gradually restructured the department all make frequent reference to such principles.

In the years since 1947, there have been many calls for better, more efficient, and more effective management of the Department of Defense. Some come from the General Accounting Office (GAO), which offers many suggestions every year—some practical and some not, some useful and some not, some adopted and some not. In 1981 the retiring Comptroller General, Elmer Staats, indicated that he had delivered to the new Secretary of Defense a list of fifteen suggestions. The savings from their adoption would, he said, reach

an "absolute minimum" of $4 billion a year by 1985. A further list, which would take longer to implement, could be expected to increase the annual savings to $10 billion. Some of the proposals were new, most were not, but none of the good ones was at all easy to implement or they would have been adopted before.

Suggestions also come from political candidates. As a Presidential candidate in 1976, for example, Governor Carter advocated a $5 billion to $7 billion reduction in the defense budget through the elimination of waste. In office, President Carter explained that such savings, if achieved, would mean a budget lower than it would otherwise have been, rather than a budget lower than the previous year's budget. Innumerable Congressmen, retired military officers, academics, and journalists call for savings, for rationalization, and for reorganization.

It should be no surprise that every Secretary of Defense also takes office declaring that he will cut back, eliminate waste, reorganize, and manage better. And each succeeds—to a certain extent. Some are more successful at that particular duty of the office than others. But each—and I include myself—has left office at least as frustrated by what he had failed to get done as he was pleased by what he had accomplished along these lines. There are still four tactical air forces, and there are still too many military bases and installations for the present or any reasonably anticipated size of U.S. armed forces. There is still a mismatch between the procurement of initial systems and equipment, and the procurement of spare parts. There are still fifty-cent fasteners that cost fifty dollars. Why?

Many (though by no means all) of the disappointed hopes and expectations of Secretaries of Defense can be traced to some common confusions and misconceptions. In many cases, Secretaries of Defense have in mind—and express in word and deed—different and even conflicting objectives. Pursuing some can make others difficult or impossible, or can undo them once they have been done. Furthermore, the comparison to business, useful in some contexts and in some areas of defense management, breaks down in others.

The management procedures followed in spending the $110 billion for research and development (R&D) and for procurement included in the fiscal 1982 defense budget certainly bear many resemblances to those in the private sector. But the overall size and expenditures of the Department of Defense continue to dwarf most individual business enterprises. Even Exxon, number one in the *Fortune* 500, has annual sales that are only about half the annual expenditures of the DOD. In personnel, the differences with the private sector are more obvious: The DOD has more than 2 million uniformed personnel

and about 1 million civilian employees and in fiscal 1982 supported about 3 million workers in defense industries. By contrast, Exxon has about 139,000 employees, and AT&T, the single largest private employer, has just over 1 million.

The Department of Defense also has an enormously diverse set of products, but only one line of business. Consider the following list of objectives and activities of the DOD:

- The Armed Forces must deter armed conflict and, if necessary, fight. They must be organized. This organization includes the formulation of doctrine, the creation of strategy and supporting war plans, the recruitment and training of personnel, and the deployment and maintenance of forces. Each of these activities requires a very different kind of management, although they certainly influence one another.
- The DOD must procure, repair, maintain, and often develop materiel ranging from aircraft carriers to light bulbs.
- DOD policies, programs, and operations must support the foreign policy of the United States—a truism, but not one that applies to business activities in the private sector.
- The DOD must deal with a vast and diverse set of constituencies—including the public, Congress, the media, organizations of retired military people, and the various nongovernmental associations interested in national security. The acceptability of defense budgets, programs, and activities all depend on the attitudes of some or all of these constituencies. Their views must therefore be taken into account. A great deal of consultation, explanation, and persuasion is required.

Most important, the Department of Defense differs from business because it is part of the government. There is no single number that provides a bottom-line measure of how well the DOD or any other government agency is being managed. And there is a whole set of conflicting and often legitimate forces whose pull is neither toward improved efficiency nor toward increased combat capability.

Beyond this difference, there is also a balance to be struck between cost and combat effectiveness. For any particular level of combat effectiveness, there should be a way to do the job at the lowest cost possible. Doing so makes resources available, either for additional military capability that can be translated into greater confidence of being able to support or extend U.S. foreign policy goals, for nonmilitary foreign aid that can serve the same purpose, or for support of domestic goals, including a balanced budget. But there are dif-

ferences in judgment, even among well-informed, experienced, and dedicated people, about the relative effectiveness of different military forces.

The criteria that define effectiveness vary with external circumstances and with the internal assumptions on which the comparison is based. Some of this variation is susceptible to economic analysis or systems analysis, but some is not. There are also differences between what is efficient in peacetime and what is effective in wartime. In principle, the United States wants to structure its military forces for optimum wartime use, but it is less likely to pay the high premium for such a configuration if the likelihood of war appears remote. Readiness for combat is expensive. So long as crises that require such readiness do not arise, it may come to be thought of as unnecessary insurance.

It is therefore not possible to manage the Department of Defense exactly like a business and to try to get to a bottom line that indicates profit or any other single measurable criterion. Even the management criteria used in private nonprofit organizations or in other parts of the government cannot be applied to all the various operations of the DOD.

Each of these differences from private business management is worth more detailed consideration. The problems of a government agency are familiar. Clearly there is and always will be great political pressure from local officials, members of Congress, and the White House staff on decisions, for example, to realign military bases in a way that would reduce the number of jobs at any location. There can be equal or even greater pressure on awards of defense contracts. Such pressure undermines efficient management by any economic standard.

It was easy to show in 1979 that it made sense to reduce from nine to five the number of defense contract and supply centers in the Defense Logistics Agency. And it was not too hard to determine, by economic analysis, which four should go. But only one was eliminated. The political forces in the regions concerned did not agree with the analysis and came up with alternative calculations. These were not correct, but they were difficult to prove incorrect to their authors.

In the business sector, the arguments would be heard and a decision would be made and implemented. Moreover, the final decision could be made privately, with the appropriate executive considering and judging the various arguments and calculations submitted by the parties within the organization, interested and disinterested. But in the Department of Defense there is no privacy in decision making

except in the Secretary's own office, and by no means always there. Given an arena to perform in and a captive audience, officials of the military services, Congressmen, and countless other parties engage in a debilitating amount of posturing.

The story on military bases is much the same, but it has several dimensions. There is little doubt that by the time a choice must be made between eliminating a military base in the Northeast or Midwest and one in the South or the West, analysis will show that it is cheaper to keep the one in the Sunbelt. There is some merit to the opposing contention that a more uniform distribution of bases is needed both to retain a geographically diversified infrastructure and to ensure broad political support, but I have never found that argument decisive.

My own examination, though, has indicated that there is a story behind the story. A major reason the Sunbelt bases look more cost effective by the time the choice is presented to the Secretary of Defense is the way in which many smaller decisions, sometimes biased in nature and always biasing in effect, were made well down in the organization for decades beforehand. Generally these decisions were made by senior military officers, who were thinking not only of the most cost-effective way to manage the base structure and operate the forces. They were also weighing which organization of facilities would provide a larger number of senior managerial spots. They were thinking as well about where they and their friends would prefer to serve—in the snow or in the sun. When it came time to retire, they wanted to retire near a military hospital and a commissary—and those will be where the bases are. Under such circumstances, there is little inclination to improve or expand a base in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan when you can expand one in Florida or Texas or California instead. Another well-known cause of the existing geographical base structure is the functioning of the Congressional seniority system, which put southern Democrats from safe districts in committee chairs in the days when chairmen ruled and bases were built. Those states and districts benefited accordingly.

These earlier decisions were not improper, nor have they necessarily led to the wrong result. Sunbelt bases have better flying and training weather, and in the past facilities were less expensive to build there. To some degree these remain factors in today's decisions. The personal factors do demonstrate, however, that when the time comes for a critical decision, what may seem to be a decision based entirely on cost effectiveness will often depend on other elements, influential or even decisive, that developed for quite different reasons.

It is instructive to examine some other examples of the forces that

affect management in its drive for efficiency. Shouldn't procurement be centralized? Yes, it should. But the real question is, for which items? It seems appropriate to centralize procurement of standard items, and the Defense Logistics Agency was set up to do just that. Light bulbs and raincoats can be most efficiently procured that way. But what about aircraft engine parts? They have a critical effect on combat readiness, and a good argument can be made that they should be procured by the particular command that will be carrying out the maintenance and repair.

What about centralized training? The example of undergraduate helicopter-pilot training is a good one. There is no fundamental reason that initial training in helicopters cannot be the same for the Navy as for the Army. Indeed, the Army has done the first-level training of many Marine helicopter pilots. But even during the brief period when the Navy agreed to such a change, members of Congress from Florida, where separate Navy undergraduate helicopter training is carried out, reached a different military conclusion and were able to sustain that position in Congress.

The arguments about cost and efficiency will be further complicated by different judgments as to the relative combat effectiveness of the less expensive way of doing things. Some of these differences can be analyzed and quantified, but others cannot. The same is true, of course, of many aspects of business. Not even the best opinion poll will predict consumer preferences with high accuracy. And a revolution in Iran affects the price of gasoline and sales of automobiles as much as it affects the feasibility of a given U.S. military strategy in Southwest Asia. But combat capabilities and military posture bring a sense of urgency and importance to the debate that can easily outweigh the analytical arguments for efficiency, or even for effectiveness measured by some particular criterion. If this urgency does not overwhelm the decision making of the executive branch, it can still do so in Congress, especially when it is reinforced by the political interests of members whose states or districts will be affected.

Moreover, though the separate services develop and procure equipment and recruit and train personnel, they do not make decisions about force deployment or about the use of forces in combat. Those decisions are made in the field by the unified and specified commanders, based on instructions transmitted by the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This means that when the services give advice on alternative ways of accomplishing a given combat mission, they do so primarily as suppliers rather than as users. That is, they are interested in selling more, not spending less.

Examples abound. The question of the effectiveness of land-based

or sea-based tactical air power in conventional warfare goes beyond the issue of which deployment mode is able to deliver a certain amount of ordnance on target for a given cost. The answer to that is rather clear: Over a campaign of several months or more, land-based airpower will be more cost effective, *if* both are equally available. But will land bases or bases to support naval forces be available? How soon after a crisis arises will they be available? How much materiel can be prepositioned at land bases for land-based air forces? What about the relative vulnerability to attack of land bases and the ships of a carrier task force? Answers to all of these questions depend on the particular contingency envisioned. All such answers are also subject to geopolitical judgments about the way they interact with U.S. foreign policy. And all are quite removed from the simpler issue of whether land-based or sea-based air forces, when in place, will be more accurate, more responsive, more efficient, and more economical. Many of those simpler questions can be answered by quantitative analysis—though different analysts are likely to come to different conclusions. The diplomatic and geopolitical questions are much more difficult to analyze and cannot easily be stated numerically.

Another illustration: The so-called "light" ground forces require much less airlift capability for their deployment than do armored forces. But once they get to a combat zone they will have less mobility and less punch, because they will lack the armored vehicles and helicopters needed for local mobility. Thus decisions on the mix of armored forces, helicopter-borne air-mobile forces, and infantry will depend largely on such issues as the nature of the forces they are expected to fight and whether they will be defending a limited though valuable area or moving forward from wherever they disembark into surrounding areas against enemy resistance. These issues, as much as the questions of accuracy of ordnance delivery, target detection and identification, and sortie rates that are the usual stuff of systems analysis, are likely to be the critical ones.

The list of examples could be extended almost indefinitely. The management of the Department of Defense must also choose between a B-1 and a bomber based on new technology, and between a land-based MX missile and a sea-based alternative. It must select the right mix of aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and surface ships equipped with cruise missiles. These choices depend on much analysis and even more on judgment. When a choice is made with which a particular commentator disagrees, that commentator will often characterize it as "waste." And so it can be, in one sense. Suppose a decision turns out to produce less combat capability for a given

expenditure than some bypassed alternative. Or suppose a particular weapons system's deployability or usability is incorrectly evaluated because of misjudgments of international factors. In either case, the decision produces less capability than the same funding could have done if invested elsewhere. And judgments about the best choice will vary widely, not only before the system is procured but even after it is procured and deployed or even after it is used. It is not improper to call such mistakes "waste." But that is not the same kind of waste as the unnecessary extra military bases in the United States, which add nothing to U.S. capability.

This is the nature of some of the problems. What are the solutions? The first step is to acknowledge that the conflicts and contradictions of managing defense cannot be fully resolved. They can only be traded off against each other, well or not so well. It will be argued that such insoluble conflicts obviously exist in any large organization: External political forces act on every government agency; every corporation faces difficult choices, with many of the factors largely matters of judgment and only partly quantifiable. All this is true. But the intensity of the pressures and the importance of the stakes are so much larger in the Department of Defense as to produce a qualitative difference. Individual corporate mistakes can have catastrophic financial effects for many people; wasteful or misguided domestic policies can damage the country; but mistakes in defense and foreign policy can kill us all. That alters the nature of management in these areas. In that sense, the DOD cannot be fully managed—or at least, much of it cannot be managed like a business.

Organizing parts of it in a businesslike way is desirable; it improves efficiency and saves money. The defense establishment is more efficient now than it was in, say, the 1950s. But the management of the Department of Defense still needs major improvement.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense must exercise close policy control over military strategy, force structure, arms control, research and development of weapons, force deployments, and interactions with the military establishments of other countries. Only in that way can there be reasonable assurance of a coherent defense policy and assurance that defense policy supports foreign policy. Moreover, the Secretary of Defense must have the responsibility for dealing with the various defense constituencies. These practices have generally been followed for the past twenty years, and they are being followed now. But there are some signs that they may be weakening, as they have from time to time in the past. Then the individual services follow separate global strategies, procure hardware and forces that fail to match, and conduct public relations and Congressional lobbying

activities that compete even more than usual. The need for the Secretary of Defense to exercise these particular powers, though, is so clear that in the long run they will always come back to him and his staff.

The Military Departments should probably have more authority than they have had recently in contracting and procurement and in training and experimenting with different kinds of combat organization. Then the Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs must be held accountable for the results. This is one area in which I am not particularly satisfied with my own performance. The problem is that it is difficult to hold subordinates (especially middle-rank civilians) accountable for their performance in government. It is then often fairer—and easier in the short run—to pull the authority back to the top level.

It is neither feasible nor desirable to abolish the Military Services, which create and foster the kind of morale and loyalty on which military organizations so much depend. Moreover, the Military Departments offer one of the few forms in which necessary decentralization of business-type responsibilities can be effected in the Department of Defense.

The need for improvement and some ways to achieve it have been described; fairness demands an overall assessment. Mine is that despite its difficulties, the Department of Defense is nevertheless the most efficient and the best managed—even in business terms—of all the major departments and agencies of the U.S. government. (Unfortunately, that is damning it with faint praise.) It operates more effectively than the others and is (along with the Department of State, perhaps) the most ably staffed—by military and senior civilian officials alike. Presidents, White House staffs, governors, and mayors turn to DOD when they need something done even outside the military sphere. This is not only because the Department has such substantial financial and hardware resources; it is also because DOD is organized to get things done.

But the major lesson to be drawn from any study of management in the Department of Defense is the basic limitation that any attempt to manage DOD in an ideal fashion will confront. The need to be able to fight a war will always limit the peacetime efficiency of the defense establishment. So will domestic political factors. The problem remains—and will always remain—one of balancing the need for combat readiness and capability with the need for efficiency by exerting strong leadership within the democratic political process. The pull of highly demanding requirements for flexible combat capability—employable in a variety of unpredictable circumstances

against opposing forces whose capabilities cannot be confidently foreseen—is a crucial element of our national security. Neither the democratic political process nor the requirements of combat capability can or should be totally overridden in the name of cost-effectiveness. To manage the nation's defense efficiently at the lowest possible cost, along the lines of private-sector business management and organization, is a useful standard. But meeting it exactly entails prices the United States cannot afford to pay. One is the abandonment of democratic control. Another is the loss of a war. Defense cannot be managed like a business, but it can be *led* in a way that preserves U.S. national security interests while operating effectively in a world of limits and amid the pull of conflicting interests.

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